


STORY OF THE
RUSSO-JAPANESE
WAR 1904-05

FROM 23RD AUGUST
TO END OF OCTOBER 1904

LIEUT-COL H. M. E. BRUNKER.
PART II.





Presented by Reverend Father
Summers

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STORY OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR, 1904-5

PART II.

From 23rd August to end of October, 1904.

BY
LIEUT.-COL. H. M. E. BRUNKER.
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PREFACE.

In the first part of the story of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-05, we brought the forces of Marshal Prince Oyama up to the positions they occupied at the end of July and beginning of August, 1904, after the battle of the Lan Ho, and the occupation of Haicheng.

At this time the Russian Eastern Force stood on the high ground between the Lan-Ho and the Tang-Ho, blocking the Motien-Ling—Liao-Yang road. The Western Force was on and across the railway and the Mandarin road, about and on either side of An-Shan-Shan.

In these positions the opposing armies, under Marshal Oyama and General Kurupatkin remained facing each other until the latter part of the month of August.

This part of the story commences on the 24th August, when Marshal Oyama resumed his converging advance on Liao-Yang, and carries us on till the end of October, when the opposing armies, exhausted after the battles of Liao-Yang and the Sha-Ho, halted and settled down on the banks of the Sha-Ho for several months. The Russians awaiting the arrival of further reinforcements, and the Japanese in expectation of the fall of Port Arthur which would release General Noghi's Third Army for active operations in the field.

In criticising the strategy of the Russian commander-in-chief, the reader should remember that the Viceroy, Admiral Alexiev, who unfortunately for the Russian cause, escaped from Port

Arthur by the last train which left the fortress, exercised during the war and up to his recall shortly after the battle of the Sha-Ho, an evil influence on the strategy of the campaign in hampering the Commander of the Armies in the field, giving directions that certain operations for the relief of Port Arthur should be undertaken. These in no case were successful, and in his position as Viceroy usurping military control over the conduct of the campaign. It would not be going too far to say that most of the disasters suffered by the Russian troops in 1904 may be traced to the pernicious meddling of this would be generalissimo.

In the compilation of the brief story of Part II. of this most interesting and instructive campaign, the following publications have been consulted :—

Operations of War *Hamley*

Official History of the Russo-Japanese War, prepared by the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence.

German Official Account of the Russo-Japanese War *Translated by Karl von Donat*

Cassell's History of the Russo-Japanese War.

Reports of British Officers with the Armies in Manchuria.

Lessons of the Russo-Japanese War
By General de Negrier.

Strategy of the Russo-Japanese War
By Lt. Major W. D. Bird, D.S.O.

This “story” only pretends to attempt to simplify the somewhat intricate accounts and

details of this great war, to master the subject, all, or at any rate some of the above publications should—after digesting the matter contained in the “ story ”—be very carefully studied.

The principal difficulty in following the campaign in Manchuria is the spelling of the names of places. This spelling varies in the different works on the war. In this “ story ” I have, endeavoured to give names as they are spelt in the official account of the war.

FARNBOROUGH,

H.M.E.B.

October, 1911.

STORY OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 1904-5.

PART II.

From 23rd August to 27th October, 1904,
inclusive.

THE RUSSIAN ARMY.

The normal Army Corps consisted of :—

Two Infantry Divisions.

The Divisions, as a rule, had four (light-gun) batteries, *i.e.*, 64 guns per corps and a battalion of sappers.

Each Division had two brigades, each of two regiments. Some of these had three, others four battalions.

Battalions, at most, had from 800 to 900 rifles. Squadrons or sotnias, numbered about 100 sabres. Batteries had eight guns, except the Horse Artillery batteries, which had six.

The Army Corps, according to the number of battalions in regiments, numbered about

22,000 to 28,000 rifles.

1,200 sabres.

64 to 112 guns.

Machine guns. Several Divisions had four gun, machine gun companies.

Mounted scouts. Most of the Divisions had companies of mounted scouts.

In some corps the guns numbered as many as 112 ; that is 14 eight-gun batteries.

JAPANESE ARMY.

The Japanese Army was organised on the territorial system. In each district—at the time of this war there were thirteen, but now the Army has been increased—one Division and one Kobi or reserve brigade was furnished.

The Army in the field was organised in divisions, not Army Corps. A certain number of divisions formed a Field Army.

Each Division included two brigades, each of two three-battalion regiments. A battalion numbered some 950 rifles, one cavalry regiment of three squadrons, six six-gun batteries, field or mountain; one battalion of engineers, 750 strong; with bridging train, telegraph company, etc.

The total establishment of the Division was 11,400 rifles, 450 sabres, 36 guns, 750 engineers, 5,500 others (artillery, train, medical, etc.) A Kobi brigade consisted of two three-battalion regiments, in all about 4,500 men.

An artillery brigade consisted of three regiments, each of six six-gun batteries, 108 guns.

A cavalry brigade consisted of two regiments of four squadrons each.

General Akijama's 1st Brigade consisted of two regiments, each 600 strong, = 1,200 men, and a battery of six horse artillery guns.

Prince Kannin's 2nd Cavalry Brigade (which only came up in the middle of September) numbered two regiments or 1,200 men, with six machine guns.

Each Division in this campaign had 14 Hotchkiss guns. These were organised in two six-gun batteries, and one two-gun section.

Each man carried two days' rations. One third of the men carried an intrenching tool.

Ammunition. Each man was supposed to carry 200 rounds. Sixty rounds were carried on ammunition mules.

The total weight of arms, equipment, etc., carried by the infantry soldier was about 57 lbs.

GEOGRAPHY OF THE THEATRE OF OPERATIONS.

MOUNTAINS.—The mountain area may, roughly stated, be said to lie east of the Port Arthur-Mukden line of railway and the Mandarin road.

Westward of this area lies a great plain extending to the Mongolian Hills, *see map No. 1*. Through this plain runs the great rivers Liao, Hun, and Taitsi. This region is highly cultivated and densely populated.

The mountains of Manchuria are in character rugged hills, through which only two fairly good roads existed at the time of the war—one from Feng-Huang-Cheng and the Motien Ling to Liao Yang with a branch road through Pen-hsi-hu to Mukden, and another from the Yalu Ho, via Kuan-tien-cheng and Chiao-tou to Pen-hsi-hu. Several difficult mountain roads ran north to south and east to west through the mountains. Some of these were used by General Stalkenberg and his Eastern Force during the operations on and about the Sha-Ho in October.

RIVERS.—Several rivers and numerous streams rise in the Manchurian mountains, flowing into the main rivers. The Sha-Ho flowing

"Ho" is the Chinese word for river; "Shan" for mountain; and "Ling" for pass.

westward joins the Taitsi Ho, a few miles west of Liao Yang. The Hsi-ta Ho, Tang Ho and Lan Ho flow northwards into the Taitsi Ho.

The great Liao Ho, which on its left bank receives the Hun and Taitsi Ho, enters the Liao Tung Gulf at Neuchuang or Ying-Kou. This sea-port was the immediate base of the 2nd and 4th Armies, up to Liao Yang. Kuroki's 1st Army drew its supplies from An-tung on the Ya lu Ho by the road through Feng-huang-cheng and the Motien Ling.

The Liao Ho and Taitsi Ho were navigable by junks as far as Liao Yang.

RAILWAY.—The railway to Liao Yang was not in working order until the 3rd October. After that date the supply of the armies before Liao Yang was, comparatively speaking, a simple matter.

Until then supplies for Kuroki's Army had to be carried up by means of Chinese carts, drawn by three or four mules.

Mukden and Vladivostock were connected through Harbin by a line of railway with Russia.

CLIMATE.—In Manchuria rain usually falls in July, August and September. During and immediately after rain, cart traffic practically ceases, but the ground dries quickly, and the traffic can be resumed after two or three dry days.

In October the roads freeze and remain hard, but rough and cut up by ruts.

The climate is variable in summer, at times extremely hot, and in winter, especially with a northerly wind, very cold.

TELEGRAPH.—Telegraph lines existed along the railways, and Japan was connected by cable with the Manchurian coast.

SUPPLIES.—The Liao Valley is a great grain-producing area. Beans and millet principally.

The latter grows about ten feet high, and produces for the Chinaman most of the necessities of life. The grain is used as food by man and beast, and for distilling spirit; the stalks are chopped up as fodder, and also used to thatch houses.

Mongolia produces quantities of sheep, cattle, and small horses. The mountainous country produces little millet.

Coal exists in places, principally about Fu-shan, Yentai, and Pen-hsi-hu.

TOWNS AND VILLAGES.—The towns were strongly built, square, and surrounded by high walls, and eight to ten feet thick on the top. The villages were groups of huts or houses, with stout mud walls, which were proof against bullets and light guns.

In the hills the houses and walls are built of stones, sometimes cemented together.

RUSSIAN PREPARATIONS FOR THE COMING STRUGGLE.

The Russians had, since March, 1904, commenced to fortify Liao Yang and the positions south of that place.

The Works about Liao Yang were to constitute a great bridge head over the Taitsi Ho. These works consisted of forts, redoubts, trenches, and gun positions. The outer line extended from the heights on the north bank of the river along the southern side of the town, and thence northwards

to the high ground on the right bank of the Taitsi Ho, where fort No. VIII. stood.

The outer line was thoroughly obstacled. In rear of first line, two more fortified lines had been constructed, connecting the town with the river to its north.

In addition to the then existing bridges, seven temporary bridges of boats or pontoons had been thrown across the river.

The works about Liao Yang formed the "Third line" of the Russian defences. Thus before the town could be reached, three successive strongly entrenched positions had to be carried.

The "First line of defence" extended from Ku-sha-tzu westward of An shan shan, through the heights east of the Tang Ho, and Hung sha Ling to the Taitsi Ho. The extent of this line was in all—including gap in centre—about 55 miles.

The "Second line of defence" was some fifteen miles in extent, and extended from Shu-shan-pu through Meng-Chia-fang and Ya-yu-chi to above Hsia pu on the Taitsi Ho. This line may be styled the Shu-shan position.

The "Third line" about Liao Yang itself has been described above.

The Right Section of the Russian first line of defence—the An-shan-shan position—extended from the village of Ku-Shu-tzu on the west of the railway to Ku-san-tzu on the east. It was about eight and half miles in extent, and was to be held by a large force, viz. :—

1st and 4th Siberian Army Corps, the 5th Rifle Division of the 2nd Siberian Army Corps and

General Samsonov's Cavalry division, covered in front by strong advance posts of all arms.

This section of the defence was under the command of General Zarubiev.

The Centre Section of the "First line" the Lang-tzu-shan position, extended from the high ground west of Kao-feng-su to the height marked on the map 2100, four miles N.E. of Lang-tzu-shan, was about seven and a half miles long, and held by the 3rd Siberian Army Corps, which was posted in two groups, one on each side of the Liao-Yang road. One division was entrenched in first line the remaining division in rear.

It will be noticed that a gap, some twelve miles in extent, existed between the left of the An-shan-shan section and the right of the ground held by the 3rd Siberian Corps. This gap was, in a way, guarded by Grekow's mixed detachment of all arms.

The Left Section of the "First Line," the Tang-Ho position, extended along the heights west of the river and Anping from the hills, marked 2100 on the map, to the Taitsi Ho, was held by the 10th Army Corps.

One division, with one third of the other division of the Corps held the first line. Two-thirds of the latter division were posted in two groups, with a large number of guns on the Tang Ho north of Anping.

General Bildering commanded the centre and left sections of the "First line" of defence, and had as his reserve the 17th Army Corps, of which one division—Yanjul's—was on the heights S.E. of Liao Yang, on the north bank of the Taitsi Ho.

The other, the 35th division, was at first engaged in improving the works of the second line of defence at Hsia-pu, Ya-Yu-chi and Meng-chia-fang.

It may here be mentioned that during the battle of the 26th August, Yangul's division moved down in support of the 10th Corps.

The 35th division was brought down to support the 3rd Siberian Army Corps.

General Grekow's force consisting of 12 sotnias, 6 companies ($1\frac{1}{2}$ battalions) and 14 guns, as already mentioned, guarding the gap between the right and centre divisions of the defensive line, was about Talien Ho.

General Mischenko's Cavalry division watched the ground westward of the An-shan-shan position to the Taitsi Ho.

Meanwhile Marshal Prince Oyama's three armies under Kuroki, Nodzu, and Oku, with Akijama's Cavalry Brigade in advance of the extreme left, occupied the positions they had held since the end of July from and along the Lan Ho on the eastward to, and to east and west of, Haicheng, covered in front by strong advanced guards. Kuroki's Army to the east was about 15 miles from the Tang Ho position, the Fourth and Second Army on its left were about 25 miles from the An-shan-shan position.

The total combatant strength of Kurupatkin's available forces is given at from 140,000 to 150,000 men, while those of Marshal Oyama were stated to be from 20,000 to 30,000 men inferior in strength.

In many ways the situation was favourable to Kurupatkin. He, with superior numbers, occupied

a carefully selected position, which was strongly entrenched. But the advantages were lessened from the fact that his staff had over-estimated the strength of Oyama's forces, and since either flank of his position, under these conditions, might be turned, the Russian commander decided that he could only fight delaying actions on his "first" and more advanced line of defence. His ultimate intention was to concentrate on his "second" line of defence along the Shu-shan Hills, and at the first favourable opportunity using the works about Liao-Yang as a "Bridge Head" cross the Taitsi Ho and fall on the Japanese with superior numbers.

Such was the state of affairs when the Japanese commander-in-chief decided to assume the offensive. The move was to have commenced on the 18th of August, but owing to heavy rain and perhaps the expectations of the fall of Port Arthur the orders for the advance were not issued until the 22nd.

Marshal Oyama's intention was to drive the enemy out of his "First line of defence," and across the Tang Ho, and by the evening of the 28th August place his three armies on a front whence they could attack the Shu-shan position, the Russian "Second line of defence."

With this object in view, General Kuroki's First Army was to gain the high ground west of the Tang Ho, and extend westwards to join hands with General Nodzu's Fourth Army. The latter force was, if possible, to gain the hills south of Meng-chia-fang, with its extreme left about Ying-tau-yuan near Sha-Ho, while General Oku's

Second Army was to assemble on the banks of the Sha-Ho.

This river must not be confused with the larger Sha Ho, between Liao-Yang and Mukden, which was the scene of severe fighting between the 9th and 17th October, 1904.

General Noghi with his Third Army had made many desperate assaults on the works of Port Arthur, viz., on the 7th, 8th, 9th, and from the 13th to 15th, and again from the 19th to the 24th August, but these efforts failed in spite of the determined and conspicuous gallantry of the Japanese assaulting columns. Immediately after the last failure on the 24th, the Japanese advance on Liao Yang, so long delayed, was resumed.

Kuroki had to fight his way forward against a strong, but passive resistance. Generals Oku and Nodzu were not seriously opposed, and carried the An-shan-shan position (which had been abandoned by the Russians on the 27th) on the 28th August. General Kuroki, having gained the battle of the Tang Ho on the 28th August, all three Japanese Armies were in touch with each other along the front of the Russian "Second line of defence."

This position was strongly entrenched, but the Japanese attacked, and the battle of Liao Yang which lasted from the 29th August to the 3rd September, when the Russians finally abandoned the town, commenced.

The Japanese Second and Fourth Armies entered Liao Yang on the 4th September.

Of Kuroki's Army 12th and 2nd divisions crossed the Taitsi Ho on the 31st August, and moved

north-west with the intention of cutting the Russian line of retreat on Mukden. The Guard division could not cross till the 4th September. Kurupatkin, after severe fighting, frustrated Kuroki's attempt, and made good his retreat northward.

Although the Russians retired from Liao Yang they can hardly be described as having been defeated. The retreat was ordered by the commander-in-chief. At the final stage of the battle General Kurupatkin held victory in his hand, General Kuroki's army, only the 2nd and 12th divisions (for the Guard division was not yet up) was exhausted. The Russian reserves were not only in great strength, but were practically still intact. All that was necessary was to lead them against the enemy. But this was not done, and the army, instead of attacking, was backed into its pre-arranged position in rear. After the battle, Kuroki's 12th and 2nd divisions took post along the Yentai Railway from the main line on the left to the coal mines on the right, with Umazawa's mixed Brigade in advance of the right, the Guard division remaining some miles in rear of the centre. And there it remained for seven days. The Second and Fourth Armies remained in and about Liao Yang until the 10th September, when they too commenced to cross the Taitsi Ho and moved northward, and on the 16th, 17th, Oyama's Armies stood with Kuroki on the right, Nodzu in the centre and Oku on the left, on a line from the hills east of Chien-tao to San-tai-tzu with Umazawa's mixed Brigade at Pien-niu-lu-pu, in rather a dangerous and exposed position.

Kurupatkin's Army reached the neighbourhood of Mukden, and steps were taken to at once

strengthen and entrench positions on either bank of the Hun Ho.

The Japanese also entrenched the ground they had gained.

In these positions both opposing armies received reinforcements, but no important operations took place for some time.

Each army now covered directly its line of communications, its eastern flank on the mountains, its western watching as far as the boundary of the neutral Chinese territory.

Both armies were practically tied to the railway. The Russian immediate base of operations may be said to have been Harbin, with Mukden as an advanced base.

Niu-chuang in the Gulf of Liao Tung, was the base of operations of the armies of Oku and Nodzu, with Liao Yang as an advanced base. Kuroki's base of operations was at Antung on the Yalu Ho, his advanced base at Motien Ling.

The Japanese had no adequate reason to attack the Russians, for they had united their three armies and covered both Korea and the siege of Port Arthur. They could now afford to wait for a time. This time could be usefully employed in improving their communications with a view to bringing up reinforcements when Port Arthur fell.

Kurupatkin on the other hand had every temptation to attack. Both his army and the Russian nation were disturbed by repeated failures. The Baltic fleet was on its way to the East, and it was urgently necessary to relieve Port Arthur as soon as possible, both for the safety of the fleet already there, and to secure the harbour as a base for the fleet that was coming. The Russian Army south

of Mukden was numerically superior to that of Marshal Oyama, and if Kurupatkin could not win under these circumstances, he could scarcely hope to do so later on when the fall of Port Arthur would release Noghi's Army for action against him.

Accordingly, Kurupatkin took the offensive. He was unwise enough to publish his intentions in an order of the day dated 2nd October. The advance commenced on the 4th. The attack unnecessarily delayed was badly carried out, and in a battle known as the Battle of the Sha Ho, lasting from the 9th to the 17th October, the Russians were repulsed with a loss of about 50,000 men, the Japanese losing only about 16,000.

The Japanese were not strong enough to turn the victory to full account.

After the battle, the Russians took up a fortified position almost coinciding with that previously held.

The Japanese fortified themselves on the ground gained, with a view to a further advance when ready. In these positions the opposing armies remained facing each other until January, 1905.

The Siege of Port Arthur was meanwhile pressed, but it was not until the 2nd January, 1905, that the fortress surrendered, and General Noghi's Army, free to join Marshal Oyama for his grand operations against the Russian Armies about Mukden.

DIARY OF THE OPERATIONS.

THE BATTLE OF LIAO YANG, 25th AUGUST TO 4th SEPTEMBER.

The Russian Army under Kurupatkin had in the first case taken up a position on the first or outer edge of defence. This, as results proved, was too extensive (55 miles from end to end, including the gap of 12 miles in the centre between right and centre sections) for Kurupatkin's available troops, while the works in the immediate vicinity of Liao Yang were commanded from the heights south of the town. The heaviest fighting took place on the second line of defence along the Shu shan Hills, from the railway about hill, marked 693, to Hsia-pu on the Taitsi Ho, which was about fifteen miles in extent.

THE RUSSIAN OCCUPATION OF THE FIRST LINE OF DEFENCE.

This line was divided into three sections—The Right Section, the An-shan-shan position ; the Centre Section, the Lang-tzu-shan position ; the left Section, the Anping position.

The Right Section was held by the troops under General Zarubiev. It extended from Ku-shu-tzu across the railroad and Mandarin road to Ku-san-tzu to the east.

The 1st Siberian Army Corps held the ground from Ku-shu-tzu west of the railway to Nein-san-chiao to the east ($7\frac{1}{2}$ miles). The 5th East Siberian Rifle Division of 2nd Siberian Corps was posted about Ku-san-tzu.

The 4th Siberian Corps was north-east of the station of An-shan-shan.

Samsonov's Cavalry division stood on the (Russian) right of the 4th Siberian Corps near Hsi-fang-fai.

In front of the main position advanced posts had been pushed out as follows :—

At Ta-wau-tieh-tun, south-west of Ku shu tzu, Major General Zikov and Gurko's Cavalry Brigade—3 battalions, 16 squadrons, 12 guns.

At Ya-niu-wa-tzu, General Kovratovitch—5 battalions, 6 squadrons, 22 guns.

At Hou-chia-tun, General Rebinder—8 battalions, 6 squadrons, 16 guns.

At Tui-te-tzu, Colonel Prince Troubetzkoi—2 battalions, 4 squadrons, 4 guns.

At Shang-shih-chiao-tzu, General Tolmacher—2 battalions and 5 squadrons.

The Centre Section, extending from the high ground, west of Kao-feng-ssu to Hill marked 2100 ($7\frac{1}{2}$ miles), held by 3rd Siberian Corps, posted in two groups, one on either side of the Lang-tzu-shan, Liao-Yang road.

In first line stood the 6th division, with a Brigade on either side of the road. The 3rd division was held in reserve ; also in two groups, one on either side of the above-mentioned road, with detachments covering the front.

In close touch with the 3rd Siberian Corps stood the 10th Corps, holding the An-ping (western) section. One division (9th) held the ground from Hill 2100 to the An-ping-Ling.

The other division (31st) was divided into three groups. One group held the ground on the left of the 10th Corps as far as Pei-kou. The other two groups were held in reserve—one 4 battalions with some cavalry and guns just north of An-ping, the other group 8 battalions and 50 guns at Shun-shuang-tzu.

The 17th Corps (Bildering's Own) was general reserve to the Centre and Left Sections of the first line of defence. Of this Corps, one division (the 3rd Yanjuls) less a battalion at Pen-hsi-hu, stood on the high ground north of the Taitsi Ho. The other division, (the 35th) was employed in improving the defences of the second line of defence at Hsia-pu, Ya-yu-chi and Meng-chia-fang.

General Grekow's force, consisting of 14 squadrons and 12 guns, which watched the gap between the Right and Centre Sections, later on during the battle came up on the right of the 3rd Siberian Corps.

General Mischenko's Cavalry division was refitting at Liao Yang.

Meanwhile the three Japanese Armies were occupying the positions they had held since July.

On the 22nd August, Marshal Oyama moved his headquarters from Kai-ping to Hai-cheng, and issued orders for the advance. Oyama's intention was to drive the Russians out of their first line of defence, and by the evening of the 28th August to place his three armies on a front in readiness to attack the enemy's second line of defence.

The 2nd and 4th Armies were to advance against the An-shan-shan position. Kuroki's 1st Army was to attack and drive back the 3rd Siberian

Corps, and the 10th Corps over the Tang Ho.

General Kurupatkin, thanks to the excellent work done on the Trans-Siberian Railway, on 24th August, finding that he could concentrate the whole of the 5th Corps south of Mukden in a few days, and also count on the assistance of the 1st Corps, determined to offer strenuous resistance on the first line of defence, and then take the offensive should the opportunity offer itself, but realising that this action might force the Japanese to operate on both banks on the Taitsi Ho, decided to extend his fortified lines on the right bank of that river, and make use of the fresh troops to guard his communications.

Kuroki's Army commenced its advance on the 23rd August, and after pushing in the different advanced posts, got into position to attack the Russian Centre and Left Sections of their first line of defence on the 26th August.

17th Corps. During the 25th, General Bilderling's 35th division having concentrated, was moving southward towards the 3rd Siberian Corps and Yanjul's 3rd division was brought down to the bridge over the Taitsi Ho, north of Hsia-tun-tzu, in readiness to cross on the 26th, which it did, and moved south to reinforce the 10th Corps.

Before describing Kuroki's operations against the 3rd Siberian Corps and the 10th Corps, we will refer to the action of the 2nd and 4th Armies, which were to drive the Russians from their entrenched position about An Shan Shan.

General Zarubiev had decided to await a Japanese attack, but his orders from Kurupatkin appear

to have been to retire as soon as he was convinced that the enemy was advancing in superior force.

He did not have long to wait, for on the evening of the 25th August, when it was known that Kuroki's Army was in a position to carry out its attack on the Russian Centre and Left Sections of their defence line on the 26th, orders were issued for the 4th and 2nd Armies, covered by Akijama's Cavalry Brigade, to move on the An shan shan position on the 26th.

The only change which had been made in General Zarubiev's dispositions, as already described, was that Colonel Poskohov was sent with 3 squadrons and a detachment of mounted scouts on night of 25th-26th August to maintain communication with the extreme left on Hill 1400.

The Japanese advanced guards began to move from their bivouacs on the night of the 25th August. During the night and next morning, the advanced Russian posts were driven back or retired on the main body, which, acting on orders received, as above, withdrew towards the second line of defence, the Shu shan position, commencing the retreat at 6 a.m. on the 27th August. The Russian right was covered by Colonel Gurko's Cavalry, and three rear guards, one from each Corps, but their movements were not well timed, and at 3 a.m. two of these covering the 1st and 4th Siberian Corps, were still on the abandoned position, with their left (eastern) flank exposed, owing to the somewhat hasty withdrawal of the rear guard, covering the 2nd Siberian Corps, but under

cover of rain and mist it escaped. In consequence of the withdrawal of Zarubiev's force, the Japanese occupied the An shan shan position on the 27th, with little or no loss.

On the 28th August, General Zarubiev commenced to occupy his portion of the second defensive line, from Kuchia tzu on the railway west of Hill 693 to near Tassu fang, with 1st Siberian A Corps and 5th Siberian E Rifle Division. The 4th Siberian Corps was withdrawn to Liao Yang.

Zarubiev's force was covered on the right by Mischenko's Cavalry division; on the left by Gurko's Cavalry, while Samsonov's Cavalry division was posted westward of the railway and Liao Yang. .

The 2nd and 4th Armies, covered by advanced guards, followed the retiring Russians.

Now to turn to Kuroki and his 1st Army. Oyama's intention was to force back the Russians with his 2nd and 4th Armies, and with his 1st Army, after having driven the Russians across the Tang Ho, to envelop the Russian left.

Kuroki, having driven back the Russian advanced posts, was in position on the 25th in readiness to attack the Russian main position before him on the 26th August. See map No. 3. The Guard division was detached to attack the position held by the 3rd Siberian Corps, the 2nd division, with the 12th division on its right was to attack and carry the An-ping position, running along the line of hills from Hill 2100 to the Taitsi Ho.

Kuroki's plan of attack for the 26th August was to send his main attack against the Russian

Centre, and at the same time to continue to draw his enemy's attention away from that point by vigorous action against both flanks. Following this plan, one Brigade of the 12th division was to attack the Hung Sha Ling. The Guard division was to move round the head waters of the Hsi-ta-Ho against the right of the 3rd Siberian Corps, while the whole of the 2nd division and a Brigade of the 12th was to attack the centre of the Russian main position.

The Army Reserve consisted of the 29th Kobi Regiment—three battalions, and had only just, after heavy marching, reached Kuroki, but took part in the battle, being sent to aid the hard pressed Guard division.

The left of Kuroki's Army was covered by the Guard Cavalry Regiment, and 2nd Regiment from the 2nd division.

KUROKI'S ATTACK ON 3RD SIBERIAN CORPS AND 10TH CORPS ON 26TH AUGUST. *See Map No. 3.*

The Guard division, less one battalion, covered by its own artillery and two batteries from 2nd division (48 guns in all) from a position in rear of the Centre about Tun-hsin-pu, attacked the position held by 3rd Siberian Corps west of the Tang Ho with its Cavalry (two Regiments) well out westward to cover the left flank, and try to gain touch with the Fourth Army.

One battalion of 2nd Guard Brigade moved against the Russians east of the Tang Ho and north of Lang-tzu-shan.

The attack by the Guard division met with serious opposition, more especially the 1st Brigade

on the left, which had to meet a counter attack made on its left by a regiment of infantry, a squadron of cavalry, and 8 guns from the direction of Pan-chia-kou. Even aided by the Divisional Reserve it was all that General Asada's Brigade could do to hold its own, the object of attacking and turning the right of the 3rd Siberian Corps—now reinforced by General Grekov's detachment and a portion of 35th division of 17th Corps—had to be abandoned.

This Brigade (Asada's) was in a somewhat difficult situation. It was drawn up (*see Map No. 3*) in a peculiar horse-shoe shaped position, and had to meet many determined attacks. The commander applied to General Kuroki for reinforcements, and was promised the General Reserve (29th Kobi Regiment) but this could not be expected to reach him until 6 p.m.

It was evident that the Guard division could not reach the heights held by the Russians before it. But it held the ground gained. The principal factor in the Russian success in this section had been the skill with which three batteries posted south of Kao-feng-ssu had been handled. These batteries (24 guns in all) staved off a frontal attack, and left their infantry free to cope with the Japanese left.

During the fighting on the 26th August the Japanese Guard division lost 1,000 men of whom nearly 800 were from Asada's 1st Brigade.

Elsewhere matters had not gone so well for the Russians.

The 10th Corps had been forced to relinquish its main position by the Japanese 2nd division,

and the Russians on their left had suffered a reverse at the hands of the 12th division ; this reverse counterbalanced the success gained on the right, and ultimately decided the fate of the day.

The immediate objective of the 2nd division was the high ground between Kung-chang-Ling and Hill 2100. The country it had to work over was so broken and difficult that it was quite unfitted for the movement of Field Artillery. It was for this reason that half the guns of 2nd Division were handed over to the Guards, and replaced by some mountain guns. For all these reasons Kuroki decided that in attacking this portion of the Russian position, his best chance of success was to trust to infantry alone, making a night attack. The troops moved into position by night, and, without firing a shot, the attack commenced at dawn. At first the Japanese made some progress, but the Russians were reinforced and the advance of the 2nd division was effectively checked. Reinforcements were applied for, but none were forthcoming, for the Army Reserve (29th Kobi Regiment) had already been ordered to move to the support of the Guard division.

Therefore the position in front of the centre and left of the Japanese First Army was sufficiently serious, but the headquarter staff was relieved when it became known that the Right Brigade (the 23rd) of the 12th Division had met with a certain measure of success on the N. Pa-pan-Ling, east of Pei Kou.

One Brigade of 12th division (the 12th) combined with the 2nd division in the attack on the heights east of An Ping.

Before moving to the attack, the commander of the 12th division brought up a regiment and a battery from Umazawa's Guard Kobi Brigade to form his Divisional Reserve.

The remainder of Umazawa's Brigade with a squadron of Cavalry and 4 mountain guns acted as right flank Guard, posted north of Chiao-tou to watch the approaches from Pen-hsi-hu and the Russian detachment of that place.

The 12th Brigade, 12th division, moved from its camp in the evening of the 25th, and at 5 a.m. met with serious resistance, but, reinforced from the Divisional Reserve, it occupied the hilly ground north of San-chia-tzu at 8 a.m. As in the case of the 2nd division, the Japanese attack was only supported by mountain guns, on account of the difficulty in bringing up the field artillery. For some time the issue was in doubt, but at 10 a.m. the Russian division in front (the 9th of the 10th Corps) was withdrawn some distance. The battle then resolved itself into a desultory artillery duel, which was kept up till dark.

The Japanese attack on the Russian Centre had failed to attain its object, for though ground had been gained, the heights here eastwards of the Tang Ho were still in the hands of the Russians.

The 23rd Brigade of the 12th division on extreme Japanese right moved off at 8.30 p.m. on 25th, to attack the Hung-sha-Ling position before the village of Peikou at dawn.

Shortly after midnight a force of Japanese gained a footing on the N. Pa-pan-Ling without much difficulty.

The Hung-sha-Ling, an extremely strong position, was held by a Russian Regiment.

At dawn the battle here commenced in earnest. The Japanese made most determined attacks on the Russians, who offered an equally determined resistance. The Russian commander applied urgently for reinforcements, but these were refused. At last, at 6 p.m., the Russians were driven from the heights and Peikou was captured by the Japanese 23rd Brigade.

The Russian Regiment (the Tambov Regiment) on going into action was 2,400 strong, of whom 9 officers and over 500 were killed or wounded.

As soon as General Kurupatkin heard that Peikou was lost, he gave orders that the place was to be recaptured during the night at all costs, for its loss threatened the retreat of the whole line of the 10th Corps. To do this two regiments of Yanjul's 3rd division, 17th Corps—which had come up to Hei-yu—and some other troops were detailed, but before the counter attack could be delivered at midnight fresh orders from Kurupatkin arrived, directing the 3rd Siberian Corps and 10th Corps to move back on the second line of the Russian defence.

Thus the whole of Kurupatkin's carefully prepared first line of defence was abandoned, and his object now was to take position on his second and strongly fortified line of defence. This he did on 28th August.

THE RETREAT OF THE RUSSIANS.

On 26th August there was no important fighting as already mentioned on the An-shan-shan position ; but on the eastern front the two commanding points of Peikou and Tzukou had fallen. Rain, which had commenced in the afternoon, was still falling. The fords of the Tang Ho were impassable and it was feared that the bridges on the river might be carried away. In consequence of this, Kurupatkin gave up the idea of attempting the recapture of Peikou, and ordered General Bildering to withdraw to the west bank of the Tang Ho, and as this would expose the left of the troops on the southern front, they too were directed to fall back.

The retirement of the 3rd Siberian Corps and 10th Corps was carried out with great difficulty, for the rivers were in flood, and the roads in very bad order ; that of the 10th Corps was particularly dangerous, for some miles the road ran parallel to the position which had been evacuated, and there was only one available bridge, that at Ko-sao-chang. The first troops to fall back were the 9th division (on the right of the 10th Corps), which crossed by fords in Anping, and took position on the heights above. The remaining division (Vasaliev's) crossed by the bridge at Ko-sao-chang. In addition to rear guards covering the retirement General Yanjul's division (of 17th Corps) about Hei-yu, guarded the left flank of 10th Corps. When the 10th Corps was over the Tang Ho in the evening, Yanjul retired, and after crossing the Taitsi Ho, took post on the heights (and Hill 920) north of the river.

The bridge over the Tang Ho was dismantled and the pontoons floated over to the Taitsi Ho.

Fortunately for General Bildering's force, the Japanese were exhausted after their great exertions and their Field Artillery were still some miles in rear. In consequence the retirement of the 10th Corps was unmolested.

The positions of the troops of the opposing armies on the night of 27th and 28th are shown on *maps No. 3 and No. 4*.

The positions on the 28th August are specially to be noted, as on this date Kurupatkin's Army was in position on his second line of defence, while the three Armies of Kuroki, Nodzu and Oku, were for the first time since the commencement of the war, nearly eight months before, in close touch and in readiness for another attack on the enemy in its new and strongly entrenched position.

KURUPATKIN'S REINFORCEMENTS.

In addition to the troops which had taken part in the recent fighting, by the evening of the 28th the 71st division (less 4 battalions with Kossakovski) of 5th Siberian Corps with 3 batteries, reached Liao Yang. These troops were followed by a Brigade (8 battalions and 2 batteries) of the 54th division 5th Siberian Corps, under General Orlov, *which had on this date reached the neighbourhood of Yentai.

* Note.—This was the force which was badly defeated and put to rout by a portion of the 12th Japanese division, south of the Yentai coal mines on 2nd September, and which fled back to Yentai.

The 29th August was a day of comparative rest, the opposing commanders preparing for the coming struggle—the Japanese closing up their troops. Kurupatkin's were recovering from their confusion into which they had been thrown during their recent retreat, and assembling in their strongly fortified position, their second line of defence.

The dispositions of the Russian forces on this date were :—

On first line.—Mischenko's Cavalry on their extreme right, about Shui-chiu-an, west of the railway. Between the railway and the Tassu Brook the 1st Siberian Corps, with Grekov's Cavalry on its left.

Between Tassu Brook and the Taitsi Ho, above Hsia-pu, General Putilov's detachment, consisting of 6 battalions, 4 batteries, and a Regiment of Cossacks, filling the gap between left of 1st Siberian Corps and right of 3rd Siberian Corps, and guard the Tassu valley. Next the 3rd Siberian Corps, and on the left of the Russian line, the 10th Corps.

On Second line.—And at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief. General Samsonov's Cavalry Division west of Liao Yang. 2nd Siberian Corps; 4th Siberian Corps; bulk of 71st division of 5th Siberian Corps.

North of the Taitsi-Ho.—The 17th Corps, of which Yanjul's division (the 3rd) held the heights on either side of the Hill 1057, with the 35th Division on its left, between Liu-chia-feng and the Manju Yama, including Hill 920. Cavalry watched the country eastward to Kuan-tun.

This position, held by the 17th Corps, was known as the Hsi-kuan-tun position, and was considered of special importance, both on account of its strength, and because it blocked the roads leading on Liao-Yang, from the eastward, and because it protected Kurupatkin's inner or strategic flank.

The Artillery in the first line were distributed in groups in their different sections, and machine guns so placed as to sweep the approaches.

ATTACKS BY JAPANESE ON THE RUSSIAN SECOND LINE OF DEFENCE.

When night fell on 29th August, both the opposing commanders had carried out their intentions. Kurupatkin had concentrated his forces on his carefully prepared position. Marshal Oyama had completed his converging movement, and his Armies stood in one continuous line, thirty miles in extent, from Ying Shou pu on the Taitsi Ho to a point west of the railway, overlapping the Russian right.

MARSHAL OYAMA'S ORDERS FOR ATTACK ON 30TH.

The advance to the line of deployment was made on the night of 28th-29th August. On 29th orders for the attack were issued. The Second Army (Oku's) was to leave one division (the 4th) at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief, and with the 6th and 3rd divisions, was to occupy the heights from Hill 693 to Hsiu-li-tun, and to be specially careful to support the Fourth Army with its 3rd division.

The Fourth Army (Nodzu's) was to attack the

line of defence between Hsiu-li-tun and Tsao-fan-tun.

In conjunction with the Fourth Army, the Guard division and 29th Kobi Regiment was to attack the hills above Meng-chia-fang, assisted by the 3rd Brigade of the 2nd division. The remainder of the First Army, 12 division and 15th Brigade, 2nd division, was to cross the Taitsi Ho about Chiang-Kuan-tun and move north-west against the Russian line of communications.

Akijama's Cavalry on the extreme left of the Second Army watched Mischenko, and reconnoitred to west and north-west.

In the eastern section of the field, Kurupatkin was considerably stronger than his adversary, but in the western he was somewhat inferior in strength. Even here, however, his strong reserves gave him the power of meeting the attack with even or superior numbers, so soon as the intentions of the Japanese commander were disclosed.

By Oyama's orders :—

Four divisions (with one in reserve—the 4th) viz., whole of Second Army and 5th division of the Fourth Army were massed against the 1st Siberian Corps west of the Tassu Brook.

And east of the Brook (2 divisions and 2 brigades) 10th division, 10th Kobi Brigade, Guard division and 3rd Brigade, 2nd division, were opposed to the 3rd Siberian Corps, 10th Corps.

While $1\frac{1}{2}$ divisions—12th division and 15th Brigade, 2nd division, would be opposed to the 17th Corps north of the Taitsi Ho.

Umazawa's Mixed Brigade, consisting of the Guard Kobi Brigade, a battery, and a squadron which was at Chiao-tou (15 miles south-east of

Pen-hsi-hu) was ordered to move on 31st August towards Pen-hsi-hu.

BATTLE ON THE SHU SHAN PU POSITION, WEST OF TASSU BROOK.

On 30th August, the Second Army, in co-operation with the 5th division, of the Fourth Army, attacked the positions held by the 1st Siberian Corps, under Stalkenberg, but were repulsed with heavy loss. A turning movement which was to be made by Oku's 6th division against the Russian right was delayed, owing to heavy rain, and when it came off the Guard division, the Fourth Army, and the right of the Second Army had already been checked. Marshal Oyama had retained his 4th division in reserve on his left, in order to meet a possible counter attack, but though the ground favoured such an attack, Kurupatkin preferred to use his reserves to reinforce each point, as it was threatened. And at the conclusion of the day's fighting, he had only four battalions as a reserve, the remainder were scattered along the line

Of other possible reinforcements. Orlov's Brigade—8 battalions with 2 batteries—was on the northern Sha-Ho.

THE BATTLE OF 30TH ON EAST OF TASSU BROOK.

The attack was made as ordered, but owing to some misunderstanding between 10th and Guard divisions, there was a want of combination,

and the attacks on this section of the defence failed.

KUROKI'S PREPARATIONS FOR CROSSING THE TAITSI HO, TO OPERATE AGAINST KURUPATKIN'S LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS.

During the heavy fighting of this day (30th) Kuroki was making his preparations for the crossing of the Taitsi Ho on the 31st by his 12th followed by the 2nd division, at Lien-tao-wan. The 2nd division was to leave its artillery near Tiao-shui-lu to cover the advance, while its infantry, after crossing the river, had to march on Kuan-tun. A portion of the 2nd division was to construct a bridge at Chiang-kuan-tun. The Guard division was left to co-operate with the Fourth Army.

The crossing of the river was carried out without opposition, and Kuroki ordered 15th Brigade, 2nd division, to take the Manju Yama and village of Hsi-kuan-tun, and then push on to Hill 920, the 12th division to prolong the line to the right and ultimately fall on the Russian communications with Mukden.

The 3rd Brigade, 2nd division (when it could be spared) was to cross the river and join remainder of its division.

From early morning the movement of the Japanese to the north bank of the Taitsi Ho had been noted and reported by the officer in command of the Russian Cavalry reconnoitring towards Kwan tun, at 6 a.m. But the report was

delayed, owing to faulty telephonic communications, and no attempt was made to oppose the crossing of the river.

Later the 17th Corps took position on the Hsi-kuan-tun position, and to protect its flank, a force of 12 squadrons, 2 battalions, and 6 guns, under General Oberliani was sent towards the Yentai Mines. General Orlov was ordered to move on Yentai, which he reached on 31st.

During night of 30th-31st August Kurupatkin was endeavouring to concentrate his reserves, which had been so scattered during the fighting of 30th.

On 31st, the attacks on the 1st Siberian Corps aided by 5th E. Siberian Rifle division, were continued and pressed with vigour by Oku's Army in co-operation with Nodzu's 5th division. Oyama still retained his 4th division in reserve, but later it was directed to attack the right of the 1st Siberian Corps, but owing to an apparent counter attack by the Russians, was delayed, and owing to darkness, did not come off. Only at one point did the Japanese succeed in gaining a footing in the Russian main position. This was at the trenches on the Hill near Hsiu-li-tun, north-west of Ta-Wa. This attack was prepared and covered by the whole of Oku's Artillery, including the heavy batteries, which concentrated their fire on the point selected for assault. The assault succeeded, as already stated, but at very heavy loss (some 7,000 men killed and wounded).

Further to the east, beyond the Tassu Brook, the 3rd Siberian Corps attacked by the 10th division of the Fourth Army, and the 10th Corps

attacked by the Guard division of Kuroki's Army, were not pressed, and there the Russians held their ground.

But north of the Taitsi Ho, the activity of the Japanese caused General Kurupatkin much uneasiness, and he resolved to evacuate the position which he had held so successfully, and to move with all his available force across the Taitsi Ho, and overwhelm Kuroki. This decision was based on the supposition that Kuroki's force north of the Taitsi Ho numbered 65,000 to 70,000, which had this estimate been correct, would have seriously threatened the line of retreat on Mukden, whereas on this date, 31st, Kuroki had on the northern bank of the river from near Kuan-tun to near the Wu ting shan only the 12th division and the 15th Brigade of the 2nd division, with the 2nd Guard Kobi Brigade about two miles in rear of his centre, while before him the 35th division 17th Corps held Manju Yama and the high ground south-west of Hsi-kuan-tun, with the other division (Yanjul's) of the Corps on either side of Hill 1057.

Oberliani's detachment of all arms was about two miles north of Manju Yama.

General Kurupatkin's plan was to abandon his second line of defence, and, after leaving a strong force to hold the third line of defence, the works round Liao-Yang (4th Siberian Corps, 5th E. Siberian Rifle division, and a Brigade, 10th Corps) to move to the right bank of the Taitsi Ho, and then, after taking position on left of 17th Corps, to the heights near the Yentai Mines, to move against and overwhelm Kuroki.

Samsonov with Cavalry division to move to Yentai Coal Mines.

Mischenko and 1st Siberian Corps to take position southwards from Yentai railway.

3rd Siberian Corps to move to Chan-hsi-tun in rear of 1st Siberian Corps.

10th Corps, less Brigade left at Liao Yang, to move to position south of Hill 920.

Orlov from Ventai, to move to Hills just south of Ventai terminus of the railway.

The retreat was carried out silently and in order during the night of 31st August-1st September, without knowledge of Japanese, and by the 2nd September, Kurupatkin's troops had reached their assigned positions.

When the Japanese found that the Russians had retired, the abandoned position was occupied by the Guard division to south of Hsia-pu, the Fourth Army, and a portion of the Second Army, the remainder swung round to a position facing the southern half of the Russian works, west of Liao Yang, with Akijama's Cavalry echeloned in rear of the left of Oku's Army.

On the night of 1st-2nd September, the 15th Brigade, 2nd division of Kuroki's Army, captured the Manju Yama, and on 2nd the 3rd Brigade, having crossed the Taitsi Ho, joined and completed its 2nd division.

Later in the day several attempts were made to recapture the Manju Yama, but failed, and Orlov's detachment, which had been directed to move south to aid in the attack on the Manju Yama, was attacked and routed by the 12th Brigade, 12th division, near Tzu-shan, and fled

in confusion to Yentai, whence it had but a few hours before advanced.

On this day the Guard division, after unsuccessfully attempting to force a passage on the Taitsi Ho before it, was directed to move back, via Anping, and re-join Kuroki's Army north of the river, one Brigade to cross at Chiang-kuan-tun, the other by the bridge being constructed near Hsia-ping-chu.

General Umazawa's Brigade crossed the Taitsi Ho on 31st August or 1st September at Pen-hsi-hu, and forced General Liubavin to retire towards Pien-niu-lu-pu, and after leaving a small detachment to watch his flank and rear at Shang-ping-tai-tzu, turned westwards towards the Yentai Coal Mines, his advance combined with that of the 12th Japanese division caused General Samsonov to retire.

The defeat of Orlov's force, together with the combined advance of the 12th division, and Umazawa's Brigade, endangered the Russian left (or strategic) flank. At midnight, 2nd-3rd September, Kurupatkin still thought the Manju Yama and hills south of it were held by the 17th Corps, and though the fighting on that day cannot be considered as satisfactory for the Russians, still, the situation did not appear to him to be unfavourable. His reserves were strong and practically intact, but at 3 a.m. news was received that the 1st Siberian Corps had retired to Liu-liu-kou. Next came the news of the Manju Yama, and the retreat of the greater portion of the 17th Corps to Ehr-tao-kou. All this, combined with the rout of Orlov's detachment, altered Kurupatkin's plans.

The retreat of the 1st Siberian Corps laid open his line of communications—the road from Pen hsi hu to Mukden—was only guarded by Liubavin with $3\frac{1}{2}$ battalions, 14 squadrons and 8 guns, and the Russian commander decided to retire.

The situation, as it turned out, was not so critical as was thought.

Kuroki's position was no less difficult. The 15th Brigade had suffered heavily, and though the 12th division had not been so seriously engaged, only the 2nd Guard Kobi Regiment and 5 battalions of the 3rd Brigade (8 battalions in all) remained in reserve.

In these circumstances had the 3rd Siberian Corps, strengthened by troops from Yanjul's division, and those troops of the 10th Corps which had not been engaged during the night in attempting to capture the Manju Yama, been sent in to attack, that attack might have been successful.

But no attack was made, and at 6 a.m., 3rd September, orders were issued for a retreat on Mukden.

The rear guard, which had been holding the works about Mukden, was ordered to abandon Liao Yang and retire on Mukden. On 4th September, the Second and Fourth Japanese Armies occupied Liao Yang. *See positions as marked on maps No. 3 and No. 4.*

Kurupatkin's retreat, owing to the exertions which Kuroki's troops had undergone, was unmolested.

On 5th September, Kuroki's Army was disposed as follows:—12th, with 2nd division on its left along the Yentai railway; Guard division, about

5 miles in rear of the centre about Lui-chia-fang ; and Umazawa's Mixed Brigade at Pan-la-shan-tzu, about 2 miles north of the coal mines.

Oku's and Nodzu's Armies, with Akijama's Cavalry Brigade, were in or about the works around Liao Yang on the left bank of the Taitsi Ho.

Kurupatkin's Army reached Mukden on 6th-7th September, and the troops were distributed as follows :—

Of the Cavalry.—Grekov's Cavalry kept touch with the Japanese along the Sha Ho and Shih-li-Ho.

Mischenko with his Cavalry stood eastwards as far as the Fu-shun—Pen-hsi-hu road ; and

Samsonov's Division east of Fu-shan.

Besides these there were the customary detachments well out on both flanks.

The 17th and 10th Corps, with the 4th and 2nd Siberian Corps remained south of the Hun Ho, and set to work to construct a semi-circle of forts round a radius from Hun-ho-pu to Yan-su-chian-tzu, to act as bridge heads to the bridges carrying the railway and Mandarin road.

The 1st Siberian Corps moved to Fu-ling, six miles east of Mukden ; the 3rd Siberian Corps to Fu-shan, twenty miles farther east. These two corps then proceeded to entrench the line of the Hun, constructing works on both banks of the river, and in improving roads to the localities, occupied by the various Corps.

The 1st Corps, lately arrived from Europe, was a few miles north of Mukden.

Of the 5th Siberian Corps which had been broken up during the Battle of Liao Yang, the

bulk were under General Dembrovski to the westward. The remainder were attached to the 3rd Siberian Corps.

The works about and to the eastward of Mukden were completed on the 28th September. On this day Kurupatkin's Army was reorganised into two wings and a reserve, and secret orders were issued for an advance, the Right Wing or Western Force under General Bildering ; 10th and 17th Corps with General Grekov's Cavalry—64 battalions, 40 squadrons, 190 guns, 2 battalions of sappers.

General Dembrovski's detachment—12 battalions, 16 squadrons, 32 guns, and two battalions of sappers.

50,000 rifles ; 7,500 sabres ; 222 guns ; 2,000 sappers.

Left Wing or Eastern Force, General Stakenberg. 1st and 3rd Siberian Corps ; 5th E. Siberian Rifle Division (2nd Siberian Corps).

General Samsonov's Cavalry division.

73 battalions, 34 squadrons, 164 guns, 3 battalions sappers,

60,000 rifles ; 8,000 sabres ; 3,000 sappers.

Reserve. General Zarubiev. 4th Siberian Corps, 1st European Corps, 6th Siberian Corps (less a Brigade), Mischenko's Cavalry (11 squadrons with 8 guns).

80 battalions ; 26 squadrons ; 326 guns ; 3 battalions sappers ; 60,000 rifles ; 2,000 sabres ; 1,500 sappers.

General Rennenkampf had under him, including General Ekk and two minor detachments, General Liubavin's Cossack Brigade with 6 guns, 13 battalions, 16 squadrons, 30 guns, 1 company

sappers ; 10,000 infantry, 1,200 sabres, 100 sappers.

General Rennenkampf in the Sha Ho operations acted in combination with Stalkenberg's Left Wing against the Japanese right.

Kurupatkin therefore had available for active service operations, about :—

180,000 rifles ; 18,000 cavalry ; 742 guns ; 6,500 sappers.

Within less than a month Kurupatkin was well provided with men and material, but like his opponent, was ignorant of the mountainous country to the eastward, as the only maps available were bad. To gain information, numerous reconnaissances were carried out in the mountains. These awakened the suspicions of the Japanese, who reinforced their right. When Kurupatkin learnt of the move of the enemy's Infantry to the eastward, he inferred that another attempt would be made to turn his left. Accordingly, more reconnoitring parties were sent out to find out the enemy's intentions. These led to constant collisions between the outposts, but beyond these and the attack on Umazawa's detachment at Pien-niu-lu-pu on the 17th September, nothing important occurred till Kurupatkin announced his advance southward on the 4th October, which brought on the Battle of the Sha Ho, which lasted from the 9th to the 17th October, both dates inclusive.

Marshal Oyama, after Liao Yang, realising it would be useless to attempt any further pursuit of the retiring Russians, set himself to prepare for a further offensive when the time came. He had lost considerably in the recent operations, units required to be filled up. The troops also

required rest and refit, and further, his communications required re-adjustment, and bridges over the Taitsi Ho had to be constructed.

The main line from the south, and from Niu-chuang or Ying-kou, was in working order up to Liao Yang by 3rd October. The navigation of the Taitsi Ho was improved, so that junks could bring up supplies, etc. by water to the town. By these means the Second and Fourth Armies, and later on, the First were supplied. The old line of communication of the First Army, via the Motien Ling to Antung on the Ya lu Ho was still retained, and along it from the Ya lu a light line of railway was being laid.

Oyama's Armies gained reinforcements.

On the 10th September the Second and Fourth Armies commenced to cross the Taitsi Ho from Liao Yang, and by the 17th of the month the Japanese Armies stood as follows :—

First Army.—From the hills east of Chien-ton, through Ta-lien-kou to Ying-cheng-tzu.

Fourth Army.—From Lan-ni-pu to the vicinity of Yen-tai, two miles west of the railway.

Second Army.—From Ta-pa-tai-tzu to San-tai-tzu.

Akijama's Cavalry Brigade on the left moved to Niu-chu to reconnoitre the banks of the Hun Ho.

On this day (17th September), Prince Kanin's 2nd Cavalry Brigade (8 squadrons and 6 machine guns) reached Liao-Yang, and was directed to join Kuroki's Army on the right. On arrival it halted at Ta-yao-pu.

Umazawa's Brigade with a battery and a squadron, which was posted in rather an isolated position

in advance of the extreme Japanese right at Pien-niu-lu-pu, was on the 17th attacked by a portion of Rennenkampf's command, but held its ground. The Russians withdrew in the evening. There were further indications that the Russians were advancing southwards from Fu-shun and also down the Taitsi Ho towards Chiao-tou and Pen-hsi-hu. To meet these threats, Umazawa's Brigade was reinforced by a Regiment (3 battalions) of Infantry, and two batteries, and the officer commanding Kuroki's line of communications was directed to send all the men he could spare to garrison the two threatened villages. During the following days the pressure on the Japanese right continued, and Marshal Oyama ordered Kuroki to close his Army to its right, and assemble a strong force in rear of his right flank. The Fourth Army extended eastwards to cover the ground vacated by the First Army.

At this time the Japanese forces, though their strength, as usual, was exaggerated by the Russian staff, only numbered about 115,000 rifles, 5,400 sabres, 534 guns, 5,400 engineers, made up as follows :—

First Army. Kuroki :—

Guards, Second and Twelfth Divisions.

Umazawa's Mixed Brigade.

29th Kobi Regiment.

Prince Kanin's 2nd Cavalry Brigade.

40,000 rifles ; 2,500 sabres ; 120 guns ; 2,000 engineers.

Fourth Army. Nodzu :—

5th and 10th Divisions.

20,000 rifles ; 400 sabres ; 72 guns ; 1,400 engineers.

Second Army. Oku :—

Third, Fourth and Sixth Divisions.

Akijama's 1st Cavalry Brigade.

30,000 rifles ; 2,500 sabres ; 114 guns ; 2,000 engineers.

General Reserve, near Liao Yang :—

3rd, 5th, 10th and 11th Kobi Brigades.

One Artillery Brigade and some other Artillery units.

25,000 rifles ; 228 guns.

At this time Baron Noghi's Third Army besieging Port Arthur (1st, 9th, and 11th divisions, 1st and 4th Kobi Brigade) numbered 45,000 rifles ; 450 sabres ; 180 field and 222 siege guns and 3,500 engineers.

TOPOGRAPHY OF THE COUNTRY ON WHICH THE BATTLE OF SHA HO WAS FOUGHT.

It was bordered on west and north by the Hun Ho, on south by the Taitsi Ho, on the east by the head waters of the tributary streams, between two of which, the Sha Ho and Shih-li-Ho, the greater part of the fighting took place. The railway ran on an embankment, ten to fifteen feet high, and marked the eastern limit of the plain. The plain was covered by villages, which could easily be placed in a state of defence, and was highly cultivated. When the battle was fought the millet had been cut, thus affording no cover, but the pointed stalks impeded movement.

Note.—The 8th Japanese Division arrived during the battle but though it reached Yentai from Liao Yang, where it had detrained on the 13th October, it took no part in the fighting of the Sha Ho.

The most serious obstacles to movement were the streams and rivers running from the high ground on the east to the Hun Ho on the west. These had muddy or sandy bottoms, were difficult to ford, and flowed some 12 to 15 feet below the level of the plain. At the water's edge was usually sufficient space for infantry to march or for concealment of reserves. Crossing places for wheeled traffic were found near the villages, but the descent and ascent were often so steep that guns and wagons had some difficulty in crossing.

East of the railway and Mandarin road and for some little distance low sandy hills existed. To the eastward of a line from Putilov Hill to the coal mines the country became rapidly more mountainous, large bodies of troops were confined strictly to the bridle paths. The same rugged country lay to the south and east and up to the Taitsi Ho.

In this wild region the hills were bold and precipitous. Movement off the tracks was difficult for infantry, and impossible for other arms. This was then the country through which Kurupatkin delivered his main attack.

COURSES OPEN TO THE OPPOSING COMMANDERS.

"Rivers and mountains afford opportunities to skill and talent, and embarrassments to incapacity." The great Hun Ho to the west, and the mountains north of Pen-hsi-hu exemplify the truth of the above statement.

The Hun Ho complicated the problem presented to Oyama, for he could not, without placing his

Army astride that river, carry out a converging movement against the Russians, nor could he turn or envelop their right flank without the risk of exposing his line of communications. The Hun Ho presented equal difficulties to Russian attack from that direction, though from the fact that Kurupatkin had directed a bridge head to be constructed about Chang-tan, it would appear that this plan of operations did enter into the General's mind.

The Hun Ho, again, protected the Japanese left.

The presence of the mountains to the eastwards where movement was very difficult and slow, would have prejudiced turning movements from or against the Japanese right.

Had Oyama been able to rapidly move his armies west of the Hun Ho, he might have been tempted to try and surprise the enemy, by moving the whole, or the greater part of his forces over the Taitsi Ho and Hun, and then marching between the Hun Ho and Liao Ho, attacked the Russian right, thus turning the Russian works south and east of Mukden, and at the same time utilising the Hun and Liao as lines of supply. But the danger here was that the Japanese might have been defeated in detail while passing the river, and the communications with Liao-kou and Dalny would, at any rate, be temporarily uncovered. But works at Liao Yang should have sufficed to protect these lines until Japanese pressure on the Russian communications would oblige him to abandon any enterprise south of Mukden and conform to the movements of his adversary. On this point we

may quote from "Operations of War," by Hamley, page 99 :—

"It may be assumed that when two armies are manoeuvring against each other's flanks or communications, that army whose flanks or communications are most immediately threatened will abandon the initiative and conform to the movement of its adversary."

The importance of this fact is immense, for the commander who finds himself on his enemy's flank or rear, while his own is still beyond his adversary's reach, may cast aside all anxieties for his own communications, and call up every detachment to the decisive point, certain that his enemy will abandon his own designs, in order, if possible, to retrieve his position.

Again, if he did not think it advisable to adopt so bold a course, Oyama, trusting to the protection to his left, afforded by the Hun Ho, might advance direct on Mukden with his Second Army, moving the Fourth and First Armies in echelon behind the Second, through the hills, towards Fu-shun. He could force the passage of the Hun, but supply in the rough country would be difficult and little was known of the topography of that district. Such an operation through such country would necessarily be slow, and the Second Army would be, at any rate, temporarily isolated and exposed to defeat before the others could come to its assistance. A Russian success against the Second Army would have so menaced the Japanese communications as to have caused Oyama to abandon his initiative and conform to his enemy's movements.

As the Armies were disposed, each covered its line of communications, and imposed either a bold turning movement or a frontal advance.

The alternatives presented to Kurupatkin much resembled those open to Oyama.

Kurupatkin, about the middle of September, imagined that Oyama had at his disposal from 160,000 to 170,000 men, or about 40,000 more than he actually had.

The dispositions of the Japanese Armies were supposed at this time to be as follows :—

Two divisions across the railway from Yentai westwards, four divisions to the north of Liao-Yang, two divisions near the Yentai Coal Mines, and two divisions between Pien-niu-lu-pu and Pen-hsi-hu. Thus, giving the Japanese credit of having ten available divisions instead of eight, which was all they had at the time, for the 8th division did not arrive on the scene until the battle was in full swing, and even then was not in time to take part in it.

Several courses were open to Kurupatkin. Establish a strong bridge head south of Mukden, and fortify the river upwards to Fushun (which he did) to secure his communications ; cover his front with his Cavalry infinitely superior in numbers to that of the Japanese ; march the bulk of his Army down the right bank of the Hun Ho, and attack the Japanese left. Such a move was risky and rather close to the Japanese left flank.

Or move astride the Hun Ho, and with one portion attack the Japanese in front, while the other crossed lower down and attacked the enemy

in flank. This plan would risk defeat in detail as the two portions of the Army would be separated by a wide river, and the Japanese, while holding the portion of the Hun, could concentrate against the other portion east of the river.

Or by advancing from Mukden and Fu shun an attempt might be made to try to envelop the Japanese right in the mountainous district of Pen-hsi-hu, while engaging them in front ; then, having defeated their right, there would be little difficulty in crossing the Taitsi Ho and advancing against their communications. Against this was the difficult and practically unknown mountainous country to the east ; also because the Russians had very few mountain guns, and because supply in such a region would be difficult.

Or an attack might be made on the Japanese right, so as to draw their reserves in that direction, and then move in force to attack them with the right and centre.

In this case the Japanese commander might, seeing through the Russian plan, trust to the force detailed for the purpose, holding the Russian left, while he, with the bulk of his Army, attacked their right, more especially as their communications lay behind that flank.

Kurupatkin, having weighed the pros and cons, though he did not think his Army was strong enough to hope for much success, determined that active measures were better than awaiting attack, and issued his secret orders on the 28th September for the coming operations, and then on the 2nd October, published his celebrated order of the day, in which he stated that now the Russian Army

was strong enough to begin a forward movement, and added : "We must go forward fearlessly, with a firm determination to do our duty to the end, without sparing our lives."

The publication of such an order was, to say the least, unfortunate. It may even be said that it is inexplicable.

The Russian commander's plan was, roughly speaking :—

The right wing, under General Bildering, to move down the railway and make a demonstration against the main forces of the Japanese, and at the same time act as a containing force and guard the line of communication against a possible counter attack. Bildering was to act with discretion, and each day the line taken up by the advanced guard was to be quickly placed in a state of defence, and on the following day these hasty entrenchments were to be converted into a position by the main body.

General Stalkenberg, with the left wing to the eastward, was to fall on and crush the Japanese First Army, compelling it to fall back on the Yentai coal mines, and cut the communications with Pen-hsi-hu. He was not, however, to push his advance over the Taitsi Ho, but rest content with securing the right bank and endeavouring to get round the Japanese right flank at Pen-hsi-hu.

General Rennenkampf, further eastward, was to act in concert with General Stalkenberg.

General Mischenko's Cavalry was to keep connection between the right and left wings.

The Reserve, under General Zarubiev, was to follow, about six miles in rear of the centre, ready

to throw its weight in any direction.

The advance, which was to win back all that had been hitherto lost in the campaign, commenced on the 4th October.

General Kurupatkin's orders for the advance southward were very precise and detailed. The following extract gives this commander's plans :—

After giving the positions of the Japanese Armies as far as he knew, which were approximately correct, but numbers, etc. exaggerated, the orders said the Army was to advance and attack the enemy in whatever position he may be found, with the main object of getting possession of the right bank of the Taitsi Ho.

Western Force (or right wing). General Bilderling to concentrate on the line of the Sha Ho for an ultimate advance on both sides of the railway. On the second day of the march advanced guards to occupy a line north of the Shih-li-Ho and entrench. The main body (17th and 10th Corps) to occupy and entrench a position on the line—Lin-sheng-pu—sha-ho-pu—Liu-fan-tun.

Eastern Force (left wing) General Stalkenberg. On the second day of the march to occupy with the main body the line of the villages :—Pa-chia-tzu—Fei-tsun-pu—Tai-chia-miao-tzu, with advanced guards on the line from Wang-fu-ling on the east to Su-ma-pu-tzu on the west.

The main object of this force will be to take possession of the enemy's positions at Pien-niu-lu-pu.

General Reserve. General Zarubiev. On second day of the march to concentrate in the region of

the villages of Liu-kuan-tun—Ying-cheng-tzu—Tung-ling.

General Mischenko to concentrate at Liu-fan-tun.

General Dembrovski to safeguard right flank of the Army. On second day to cross the Hun Ho to the village of Ho-chia-chang-tzu, and secure the crossing at Chang-tan, where a double bridge head, covering bridges over the river will be concentrated.

General Rennenkampf with his force to safeguard the left flank of the Army, conforming to its movements.

On the 6th October, the second day of the march, as above referred to, the moves as ordered by Kurupatkin had been successfully carried out.

On this day, 6th October, reports kept coming in to General Kuroki, from which it was clear that a general advance of the enemy had begun, and that Umazawa's Brigade at Pien-niu-lu-pu was in considerable danger. It remained to decide whether to move up and support this exposed Brigade or to withdraw it. It was decided to withdraw it to Li-shu-ti-hsia in the direction of Pen-hsi-hu.

So far Kurupatkin's plan had met with a considerable amount of success. Kuroki's communications were threatened, and his advanced detachment (Umazawa's) was in danger of being cut off. But Stalkenberg, instead of being ordered to press his advantage, was directed to halt and spend the whole of the 7th October in entrenching the positions gained the day before.

The General Reserve (less 6th Siberian Corps) advanced a few miles.

The 6th Siberian Corps was ordered to move south-west and take post in rear of General Bildering's right flank.

Samsonov's Cavalry moved to Li-chia-wo-peng, and Rennenkampf to advance about San-chia-tzu on the Taitsi Ho.

Excepting these movements the whole Army remained halted throughout the 7th.

In this way a whole day was wasted, and, in consequence, Umazawa was enabled to retire unmolested. The order to retire towards Pen-hsi-hu reached him on 7th, but as his outposts were in touch with the Russian advanced guards, he waited till nightfall, and then slipping away unnoticed, he reached his destination early on the 8th. He then threw a regiment of Kobi and 2 guns into Pen-hsi-hu, up to this held only by a Kobi battalion, and posted the remainder of his weak force between that village and the Ta-Ling. To further protect his right, Kuroki moved the 12th division from Ta-yao-pu to Cheng-kou-Ling, and the Guard division to near Ta-yao-pu to replace the 12th division.

Meanwhile the Second and Fourth Armies had also time to concentrate in readiness to meet the coming advance.

On one point Marshal Oyama had made up his mind, and that was that he would not passively await attack.

On 7th, Marshal Oyama, after giving the dispositions of the Russian forces, added :—

I wish to concentrate as much as possible, so as to be able to assume the offensive at any time, if required.

First Army is to concentrate on the line from the Coal Mines to Mien-hua-pu.

The Second and Fourth Armies to concentrate on the line they are now occupying.

The 3rd and 11th Kobi Brigades, 1st Artillery Brigade, and 14th Artillery Regiment to be ready to come under my command.

During the day the 6th division (Second Army) was drawn back from the first line, and took post about Shang-kang-tzu, about two miles in rear of the centre of the Second Army, the remaining divisions extending right and left to fill up the gap caused by the withdrawal of the 6th division.

Each division of each Army, and each Army had its own reserve. The Reserve of the whole Army—the Kobi Brigades and Artillery already mentioned—was placed under command of General Uchiyama, and posted at the bend of the Taitsi Ho, just north of the Liao Yang.

Marshal Oyama was fortunate in being able to carry out the above dispositions, thanks to the unfortunate halt of the Russians on the 7th, due to the prevailing idea of fortifying “positions.”

On the 8th little or no progress was made by Kurupatkin’s forces, but again spade work was the order of the day.

Notwithstanding the slowness of the Russian advance and Umazawa’s successful retirement from his dangerous position, Kuroki had much cause for anxiety. The Russian Cavalry, under Liubavin, had crossed the Taitsi Ho, the line of communications was in danger, and the important villages of Pen-hsi-hu and Chiao-tou (fifteen miles

:south-east) appeared to be at the mercy of that enemy, if he had any enterprise. Pen-hsi-hu had been reinforced, but at Chiao-tou was only one Infantry company, though the 5th Kobi Brigade, which had recently landed at An-tung, was making forced marches to assist in the defence, but could not arrive for some days. But in consequence of further reports, Prince Kanin, with his 2nd Cavalry Brigade, was ordered to Chiao-tou, where he arrived on 10th October.

On the 9th October, attacks were made by the 1st and 3rd Siberian Corps on the Japanese position, from Pen-hsi-hu to near Mian-hua-kou, now reinforced by the 23rd Brigade of the 12th division.

Rennenkampf was before Pen-hsi-hu.

Liubavin with his Cavalry south of the Taitsi Ho was opposite Pen-hsi-hu.

The 2nd Siberian Corps of Stalkenberg's left wing at Pien-niu-lu-pu.

In the centre the 4th Siberian Corps, with Mischenko, moved south towards the coal mines and left wing of Kuroki's First Army.

On the Russian right, after a comparatively short advance, more ground was fortified. The 17th Corps fortified the ground from Shih-li-ho and across the railway to the westward. The 6th Siberian Corps fortified two lines south of the village of Lan-shan-pu.

On this date the Russian right wing and a portion of the centre had no less than four strongly fortified "positions" south of the works guarding Mukden.

The Japanese had, of course, entrenched the

ground they held, but their system of fortifying was simply a line of fire trenches, as a starting point from which, when the time came, to assume the offensive.

Except the 12th division and Umazawa's Brigade which were heavily engaged, the Japanese troops remained in an expectant attitude. All along their front the outposts fell back slowly cautiously followed by the enemy, but orders were issued for the 10th October. These are here given, somewhat in detail, as better explaining what was to follow, always remembering that Marshal Oyama had already made it perfectly clear that he meant to assume the offensive at the earliest possible opportunity. The recent movements had brought the opposing forces in such close contact that Oyama could not afford to wait any longer.

The orders were issued from the Marshal's headquarters at Liao-Yang on the afternoon or evening of the 9th October, and reached the commanders of the different Armies at between 10 and 11.30 p.m

1. The Russians in front of the First Army have greatly increased, and have begun to move towards our right flank and rear. The force on the Mandarin road has not come south of Pan-chia-pu.

West of the Mandarin road, the principal force seems to be on the line Liu-tang-kou—Ta-tai.

2. I have decided to attack the enemy before all his troops have crossed the Hun Ho, and to occupy the line Kang-ta-jen-shan—Li-ta-jen-tun.

3. The Umazawa Brigade will attack the enemy at Shang-chih-chiao-tzu, while the main body of the First Army, after waiting the advance of the

Fourth Army to the vicinity of Wu-li-tai-tzu, to attack to its front, and advance towards Feng-chi-pu.

4. The Fourth Army to advance at dawn on the 10th, and attack the enemy in the neighbourhood of Mu-chia-ku-chia-tzu and Chien-huang-chia-tien.

5. The Second Army to co-operate with the left wing of the Fourth Army, and advance towards the line Pan-chiao-pu—Ta-ping-chuang, with its main body on the right flank. A careful watch to be maintained towards Chang-tan.

6. The following troops to assemble by 10 a.m. on the ground south of Lo-ta-tai—3rd and 11th Kobi Brigade and 15th Artillery Regiment (36 guns) of 1st Artillery Brigade.

7. I will leave Liao-Yang at 10 a.m. on the 10th for Sun-chang-tzu, south of Lo-ta-tai.

Such were the orders issued on the 9th October for the counter movement of the Japanese. By Marshal Oyama's plan the 12th division and Umazawa's Brigade were to be left to oppose Stalkenberg's left wing and Rennenkampf's command, which together amounted to 6 divisions, 50 squadrons, and 200 guns. The whole of the rest of the Japanese Army, less two Kobi Brigades (3rd and 11th) and 36 guns—the General Reserve—in all 7 divisions and 1 Kobi Brigade (the 10th), were to advance direct on the forces of General Bildering and Zarubiev, whose united forces amounted to 6 divisions with cavalry, guns, etc.

As regards the Reserves held in hand by the opposing commanders, it is to be noted that while Marshal Oyama retained only two Kobi Brigades

(some 10,000 rifles) 36 guns, and no cavalry, Kurupatkin's Reserves, at any rate at first, consisted of three Army Corps (4th, 1st, and 6th Siberian Corps), Mischenko's Cavalry (11 squadrons with 8 guns), and also General Dembrovski's detachment (12 battalions, 16 squadrons, 32 guns, 2 battalions) may be included, as it was available for use anywhere if required—in all, some 65,000 rifles, 3,600 sabres, 336 guns, 3,000 engineers.

10th October :—

Under his instructions from Kurupatkin, General Stalkenberg on the 10th October should have reached a line some fifteen miles west of the strong line of hills held by Umazawa's Brigade, and the 12th division of Kuroki's Army. But the General, unprovided with any reliable maps, decided to attack only the passes before the Japanese position, and to spend the day in reconnoitring with a view of making a determined attack on the 11th with his main bodies.

On this day, Stalkenberg's left wing, the 3rd Corps near the Taitsi Ho, with Samsonov's and Rennenkampf's Cavalry, were before Umazawa's right wing, covering Pen-hsi-hu. General Liubavin's Cavalry was south of the Taitsi Ho, nearly opposite Pen-hsi-hu. The 1st Siberian Corps faced the 12th division.

The 2nd Siberian Corps was about Pien-niu-lu-pu

On this day Prince Kanin's 2nd Cavalry Brigade and some Kobi troops from the line of communications, reached Chiao-tou at 7 p.m., and the 5th Kobi Brigade from Antung was nearing it.

As a result of Stalkenberg's decision not to move on the 10th, Chiao-tou was saved. The

attacks on the passes not made in strength, failed, and by the end of the day the Japanese right flank was still secure.

Except for the fighting in the passes on the 10th October, the First Japanese Army took little part in the operations, as the 2nd and Guard divisions could not move until the Fourth Army, which was delayed. In consequence the Russian centre was not attacked, though Kurupatkin thought it was to be, and sent his 4th Siberian Corps into first line, and approached the right of the 2nd division.

The Fourth Army advanced and gained some ground to the front, finally, at night, halting on the line Kuei-tzu-shan on the east, to near Wu-li-tai-tzu on the west in close contact with their opponents.

The Second Army, westward of the railway, advanced with the object of gaining the line Pan-chiao-pu—Ta-ping-chuang, but though it did not meet with very serious opposition, it only reached by night, the line Shuang-tai-tzu, close to the railway Hu-chia-tun, west of the Sha Ho, with Akijama's Cavalry about Shen-tan-pu on the extreme left, near the Han Ho—all the line in close contact with the 17th Corps and Grekov's Cavalry.

The result of the operations on this day, the 10th October, may be summarised as follows —

Marshal Oyama, with his Second and Fourth Armies, had failed to carry out his object in its entirety, but the Marshal was, at the close of the day, in a position to make, at last, a more definite plan of action. He knew that although his right held its own and that Pen-hsi-hu was so far safe,

there were indications that the strength of the enemy on the east was being increased. There was urgent necessity for rapid and decisive action by his left wing.

He accordingly issued orders for the attack to be resumed on the 11th. By these the First Army was to attack towards Feng-chi-pu.

The Fourth Army was to drive the enemy from Wu-li-tai-tzu ; then wheel to its right and advance against Liu-chang-tun.

The Second Army, after having driven back the enemy to its front, was to advance to the line Sha-ho-pu—Kuan-lin-pu, so as to assist the wheel of the Fourth Army. Care was to be taken to guard against an attack from the direction of the Hun Ho, and the right bank of that river was to be reconnoitred.

The General Reserve, 3rd and 11th Kobi Brigade the 15th Regiment of Artillery (36 guns), and the Foot Artillery (32 guns), under General Uchiyama, to assemble at Ta-lien-kou, south-east of Yentai, in readiness to move on Tu-men-tzu, east by north of Yentai.

Oyama's headquarters were to move to Yentai.

These orders show that Oyama's intention was on the 11th October, to drive away to the north-east that portion of the Russian Army which was on or about the Mukden railway and Mandarin road, while still resisting with a comparatively weak force Stalkenberg's left wing. To succeed in attaining his object, he must break the front of the Russian 10th Corps by a frontal attack. The task was a formidable one, but if successful, the reward would be great.

On the Russian side on the 10th October, Stalkenberg's attempt to reconnoitre the position before him, and the weak attacks on the passes failed. By the inaction of his main force on his left, Chiao-tou, an important point was saved, and Prince Kanin, with his Cavalry Brigade and some Kobi troops arrived to strengthen the place.

The Russian 4th Corps, though thrown into the first line and advanced, did nothing to affect the Guard and Second divisions of Kuroki's Army.

On the *Right*, the Fourth Army was checked principally by the troops of the 10th Corps, while the 17th Corps fell back before Oyama's Second Army, but prevented the Japanese commander from attaining his object on this the western side of the field.

On the night of the 10th, the opposing forces faced each other on a front of about forty miles, from the Hun Ho on the west through Shih-li-Ho to Pen-hsi-pu on the east.

11th October :—

General Kurupatkin's intention for this day was to maintain his position (with the 17th Corps on the right, and next to it, on its left, the 10th Corps) on the Shih-li-Ho, while General Stalkenberg with his left wing continued his turning movement against the Japanese right, assisted by a forward movement of the 4th Siberian Corps and Mischenko's Cavalry in the centre .

The 1st Corps at the outset stood as Reserve at Liu-fan-tun in rear of the gap between the left of the 10th Corps and the right of the 4th Siberian Corps. The 6th Siberian Corps in rear of the right of the 17th Corps, held strongly

entrenched positions to north and south of Kuan-lin-pu.

Grekov's Cavalry was beyond the Sha Ho, some four miles westward of the 17th Corps.

Dembrovski's detachment* at Hsin-tai-tzu, with advanced posts on the left bank of the Hun Ho, watching Akijama's Cavalry Brigade, and on the right bank towards Chang-tan, where Kurupatkin had intended to construct a bridge head.

Oyama's Army stood on a line from Hu-chia-tun west of the Sha Ho to Pen-hsi-hu on the Taitsi Ho.

Oyama's General Reserve was at Ta-lien-kou, in rear of the right of the Fourth Army.

Prince Kanin's 2nd Cavalry Brigade and 5th Kobi Brigade were at Chiao-tou, some fifteen miles south-east of Pen-hsi-hu.

General Stalkenberg's main attack on 11th was made by the 3rd Siberian Corps and General Rennenkampf on the position north, east, and south-east of Pen-hsi-hu, while Liubavin followed by Samsonov's Cavalry, co-operated, after crossing the Taitsi Ho, by moving down the left bank of the river.

The 1st Siberian Corps attacked the Ta Ling, Tu-men-tzu Ling, and Chiao-hsien Ling.

2nd Siberian Corps was retained in reserve, about three miles in rear of the centre. The Japanese, to defend this extended position (nearly twelve miles) at and about Pen-hsi-hu 6½ battalions and 8 guns.

*12 battalions, 16 squadrons, 32 guns, and 2 battalions of engineers.

Between Shih-Shan and Ta Ling $1\frac{1}{4}$ battalions and 6 guns.

At the Ta Ling 2 battalions and 10 guns.

At the Tu-men-tzu-Ling, $2\frac{1}{2}$ battalions and 6 guns.

The Reserve at Li-shu-li-hsia, below the Ta Ling, $1\frac{1}{4}$ battalions.

The Russians were in vastly superior strength, but it must be remembered that in the rugged country in which all this fighting between Stalkenberg's wing and the Japanese, numbers alone were of small avail, as every movement was confined to the narrow mountain paths.

The attacks on the passes failed after severe fighting. The 3rd Siberian Corps with Rennenkampf remained in touch with the enemy before Pen-hsi-hu, but the 1st, leaving some troops before the passes, moved back to near the point where the reserve was posted.

It seems more than probable that a determined movement along the left bank of the Taitsi Ho must have been successful, for with the exception of Prince Kanin's Cavalry and some Kobi at Chiaotou, there was no Japanese force to oppose it. But such a move was not attempted.

Westward of the Tu-men-tzu-Ling the roles of the combatants were reversed. There the Russian right and centre remained on the defensive, waiting for Stalkenberg, with his powerful force, to drive off the Japanese right and advance against their communications. Oyama, with his whole force, less 12th division and Umazawa guarding his right flank, and Prince Kanin's Cavalry Brigade south of the Taitsi Ho, advanced all along the line to

the attack.

The Guard and 2nd Division moved against the 4th Siberian Corps.

About midnight, 10th-11th October, Guard division received orders for the attack to be made on the 11th, and its commander decided to move at once to seize some heights to its front, before daybreak. This was done. The instructions given to the men for this attack are instructive and characteristic :—“ Bayonets to be fixed and rifles loaded. The bayonet only to be used, unless the enemy can be distinctly recognised then fire may be opened. Japanese are short ; foreigners are tall. There are no foreign attachés with us tonight, so treat all tall men you come across as an enemy.” The latter portion was given because there had been, in this case, no time to prepare distinctive badges.

The position taken by this night attack was maintained, in spite of the Russian counter attacks, but no advance was made from it. This was to come off by another night advance and attack on the night of 11th-12th October.

General Kuroki’s intention was that while the Guard division crossed the Shih-li-Ho, near Shang-lin-lo-tzu, the 2nd division was to gain Temple Hill and Nan shan. Both these divisions acted against the 4th Siberian Corps, and General Mau’s Brigade of 37th division of 1st Corps.

Temple Hill was taken after hard fighting, though its capture may be attributed to the bad shooting of the Russians, and the speed at which the assaulting infantry covered the open space south of the hill, a hollow road, six feet below the

surface of the surrounding ground, lay as a natural fire trench for the Russians, but had been neglected by them. At no point did the enemy attempt anything more than purely passive defence.

As soon as the Temple Hill was captured, it was put in a state of defence.

The Fourth Army, 5th and 10th divisions and 10th Kobi Brigade met with stout resistance. Oyama therefore sent his 3rd and 11th Kobi Brigades and 15th Regiment of Artillery, his Reserve, to reinforce the 10th division, and at the same time withdrew the 5th division to form a new Reserve.

At all points from the Tu-men-tzu-Ling to the railway the Japanese met at least equal forces. Their extreme right, from Pen-hsi-hu to north-west had been attacked by greatly superior numbers—Stalkenberg's left wing—but from the railway westward the whole of Oku's Second Army with Akijama's Cavalry, was only opposed by the 17th Corps, for General Dembrovski on the Russian extreme right remained passive and had practically no influence. The 6th Siberian Corps also took no part in the fighting.

By evening of the 11th, the 5th division, Fourth Army, and Oku's Second Army, were in front of the Russian entrenched position from Ying-pan to the Sha Ho, with the 4th division west of the river as far as Li-la-jen-tan.

The 10th division was south of Ta-pu. The 2nd division on Temple Hill and to eastward, with a Brigade about two miles south before San-cheng-tzu Shan, with the Guards division on its right. The 23rd Brigade was on the Guards'

right to near Tu-men-tzu-Ling. A portion of the 3rd division of Fourth Army had penetrated the Russian entrenchments at Wu-li-chieh, west of the railway.

The Russians, with 17th Corps and 10th Corps Mau's Brigade in advance of the right.

The 4th Siberian Corps held the ground in front of part of 2nd division and Guard division of Kuroki's First Army.

The result of this day's fighting was that :—

Stalkenberg had been repulsed in the passes. At Temple Hill in the centre, and Yen-tao-niu-lu in the west, the Japanese had won a footing in the Russian defences, but elsewhere they had not made any material progress.

About one-third of Kurupatkin's forces had not been engaged, viz. :

1st Siberian Corps, 2nd Siberian Corps, 6th Siberian Corps, and 10th Corps (less four battalions). That is he had available over three Army Corps.

On the Japanese side all the original Reserves, with all three Armies, were employed in the battle.

OPERATIONS ON THE NIGHT OF 11TH 12TH OCTOBER.

On the west the Russians delivered a successful counter-attack on Yen-tao-niu-lu, which had been during the day captured by 3rd division of Oku's Army. In the centre, the Japanese 10th division of Fourth Army, carried San-kuai-shih-Shan, and a little further east the 4th Siberian Corps was at last driven from San-cheng-tzu-shan.

The capture of Yen-tao-niu-lu, carried out by a well arranged and well timed night attack,

re-established the 17th Corps in the position it had taken up on the 10th October.

OPERATIONS ON THE 12TH OCTOBER.

The operations carried out during the night of the 11th-12th continued throughout the 12th.

Yamada's detachment moved up in place of the 5th division Fourth Army, drawn in by Marshal Oyama to form his General Reserve, instead of the Kobi Brigades and Regiment of Artillery sent into the fighting line on the 11th.

PLANS OF OPPOSING COMMANDERS.

General Kurupatkin, who seemed to have given up the idea of standing to fight on the Shih-li Ho, on the 12th directed General Bildering that, in view of attack on his right by the Second Army (General Oku's) he was to retire to the main Liu-tang-kou, Hung-pao-shan position, about two miles north of the Shih-li Ho. Thus, even before the fighting on this day (12th) developed, the Russians were, as on other occasions, considering the advisability of retreat. But by the time the order was received, the Japanese had resumed the attack, and General Bildering, who had every reason to count on assistance from both Dombrovski, out on his right flank, and the 6th Siberian Corps on his right rear, decided to remain where he was. Unfortunately, similar ideas to retire had been sent direct to the 10th Corps, from the commander-in-chief's headquarters, who prepared to act upon them, with the result that while the

10th Corps, one half of General Bildering's force, was meditating retreat, the other half, the 17th Corps, was making ready to fight.

Marshal Prince Oyama had not altered his original plan. That, as we know, was to drive the Russians in a north-easterly direction away from the railway. There was no vacillation on his part. His orders for the 12th—issued on the 11th—were :—

1. The enemy has massed a superior force against the First Army.
2. The 10th division and 15th Artillery Regiment will attack the enemy near San-chia-tzu to-night, and will co-operate with the left of the First Army.

The Second Army will continue its attack.

3. *The intention of the commander-in-chief is unchanged.*

4. One Infantry Regiment, all the batteries of Artillery, and a battalion of Engineers, should be left under a Brigadier on the northern end of the Wu-li-tai-tzu Hill, to guard the left flank of the Fourth Army. The remainder of the 5th division is to assemble before 5 a.m. near Huang-ti* where it will await orders. Great care should be taken that this movement should not be observed by the enemy.

The detachment left in accordance with para. 4 of the above order, to guard the left of the Fourth Army, and was placed under command of General Yamada. It really consisted of 41st Regiment

*The 5th division was to become Marshal Oyama's new General Reserve.

(3 battalions), 5 Artillery Regiment, 4th Foot Artillery Regiment, 2nd Independent Heavy Artillery Regiment, and the 5th Engineers Battalion.

In addition to the above orders, Marshal Oyama sent the following instructions to General Oku :—

The principal object of the operations of your Army during the day (12th October) is to drive the enemy from the neighbourhood of Pan-chiao-pu and Liu-tang-kou, so as to facilitate the turning movement of the Fourth Army to the right. Your left flank division should, therefore, gradually move to the east so as to attack the enemy's right flank.

General Akijama's duty was to protect the flank of the Second Army, and so long as Dembrovski and Grekov made no move, he too remained inactive. At 6.25 a.m. General Akijama directed one and a half regiments of his Cavalry to get in touch with the left flank of the 4th division. The remainder of his Brigade, with his two detachments on the Hun Ho, remained in their positions.

The Second Army moved early, about 2 a.m. to carry out its orders, and to envelop the 17th Corps.

The battle on this side of the field commenced at 6 a.m. by an attack of the 3rd division, on the right of General Oku's Second Army, on Yen-tao and Shih-li-Ho, both of which places were captured, and by nightfall the 3rd division was before the Russian main position, from before Pan-chiao-pu to the west of the railway, with the 6th division on its left, from the railway to about Chien-liu-tang-kou.

General Yamada's detachment was on the right

of the 3rd division before Hung-pau-shan. The 4th division on General Oku's left flank pushing the Russians before it, lay from Chung-lu-yen-tai on right flank of the Sha Ho, through Ta-tai, to Ta-ping-chuang, with Akijama's Cavalry on its left.

By 4 p.m. the whole of the 17th Corps was in full retreat, and in considerable confusion, and suffered heavily from the Japanese Artillery fire.

A half-hearted counter attack by a portion of the 6th Siberian Corps, and Grekov's Cavalry against the left wing of the 4th division of the Second Army came to nothing.

General Dembrovski did nothing to help the sorely pressed 17th Corps.

By night the 6th Siberian Corps was in its original position on the right of Bildering's western force. The 17th and 10th Corps were in the Sha-ho-pu position across the railroad.

Grekov's Cavalry was in front of right of 17th Corps, with Dembrovski between Grekov and the Hun Ho.

The Japanese pursuit was ended at 7 p.m., and was not pushed. The night was very dark ; supplies of both food and ammunition were running short, and the Russian rear guard eastward of the railway showed a bold front.

The news of the defeat of the 17th Corps caused the utmost consternation at Kurupatkin's headquarters.

The disaster to the 17th Corps on this day (the 12th) proved to be the decisive factor in the battle.

At other points the Japanese had been able to hold their own or even gained ground, but they

were inferior in numbers to their opponents, and constant fighting and marching had exhausted the troops.

On the night of the 12th, only the 1st Corps and 4th Siberian Corps remained before the 2nd and Guard divisions of Kuroki's Army. Marshal Oyama pushed his General Reserve, the 5th division, up to north-east, towards Ta-kou, to fill up the gap between the right of the Second Army and the 10th division on the right of the Japanese Fourth Army. Stalkenberg's attack on the Ta Ling and on the position to south of it failed. The 2nd Siberian Corps was held in reserve near Pien-niu-lu-pu, inactive, during the day. It was not used to support the attack on the Ta-Ling or to reinforce the 4th Corps.

General Samsonov moved forward to act in combination with the attack on Pen-hsi-hu. General Liubavin had crossed to the left bank of the Taitsi Ho, and moved over to opposite Pen-hsi-hu.

Meanwhile, Prince Kanin, with his 2nd Cavalry Brigade, reinforced by some 1,200 Kobi Brigade, advanced from Chiao-tou at 3 a.m., and came on the scene at 10 a.m., and at 11.30 a.m. opened across the river on the Russian trenches, with his machine guns, and caused the retirement of the Russian left, from before Pen-hsi-hu, and also that of Samsonov to north and Liubavin south of the Taitsi Ho.

The arrival of Prince Kanin's force south of the river ensured the safety of the defenders of Pen-hsi-hu, and was the *coup de grace* of Stalkenberg's plan of attack, which delay and hesitation had

already doomed to failure. The Russian grand turning movement against the Japanese right was abandoned, and preparations were made for the retreat of the Russian left wing.

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS UP TO EVENING OF 12TH OCTOBER.

Marshal Oyama had gained the upper hand, and henceforth dictated the course of the battle.

From 5th to 10th, Kurupatkin's right wing had advanced some twenty miles from the Hun-Ho to the Shih-li-Ho.

His left wing had reached the Taitsi Ho, and threatened to turn the Japanese right. As soon as his opponent's plan became intelligible, Oyama advanced to meet the Russian right wing, leaving but a small force to hold the passes on his right. The two Armies may be said to have come into actual contact on the 10th.

By the evening of the 12th, the Russian right wing had been thrown back on the Sha-Ho. The left wing had abandoned the offensive, and was preparing for retreat.

But the centre, the 4th Siberian Corps, supported by the 1st Corps, was still holding a salient position where it was in danger of being crushed between the Japanese Fourth Army and Kuroki's First Army, less the 12th division on the east.

Meanwhile the Japanese Guard division, pressing on after the Russian 4th Siberian Corps, was dangerously exposed to an attack by the 2nd Siberian Corps of Stalkenberg's left wing. A considerable gap, some 5 miles, existed between it and

the left of the 12th division. This gap was guarded only by the Cavalry of the Guard and 2nd divisions, six squadrons in all, under Colonel Kasa.

Stalkenberg, prepared for the retreat of the 1st and 3rd Siberian Corps, covered by a strong rear guard to the north-east, from before the Japanese positions in the passes.

Marshal Oyama, in his orders for the 13th August, directed that his three Armies were to pursue the Russians as far as the left bank of the Sha Ho.

General Kurupatkin, in his message to Stalkenberg on the morning of the 13th, said :—

The 17th Corps has met with a reverse, and retired beyond the Sha-Ho.

This blow, coupled with the unsuccessful operations of the eastern wing (that under Stalkenberg) and its failure to capture the passes, compels me to abandon the task which I had allotted to the troops under your command, and to order their retirement northwards, in order to establish closer connection between them and the rest of the Army.

On receipt of this message, Stalkenberg, about mid-day on 13th, issued orders for the withdrawal of the whole of his command during the coming night.

General Kuroki had directed on the 12th, that General Matsunga's Brigade of the 2nd division was to move south-east on Chao-hsin-Ling, and attack the flank guard of the 1st Siberian Corps at that place, with the object of cutting the Russian line of retreat. This Brigade moved off and marched all night (of 12th and 13th) through pouring rain, and on reaching the appointed place

attacked the Russians, but though aided by the fire of two batteries, the attack failed, and Kuroki's bold attempt to cut the Russian line of retreat was a failure.

COUNTER ATTACK BY 2ND SIBERIAN CORPS.

The Japanese Guard division was heavily engaged with the 4th Siberian Corps, in front, when a force of 8 battalions, 4 batteries, and a squadron of Cavalry, under General Alexieff of the 2nd Siberian Corps, attacked it in flank, at 6 p.m. The attack was, at first, successful, but the advantage gained was not followed up. Had the Russian commander pushed in his attack, the situation of the Guard division and General Matsunga's would have been serious. The gap, as mentioned between the Guard division and Matsunga's Brigade, was filled only by two Cavalry regiments under Kasa. To set matters right, Marshal Oyama sent off his Reserve, the 5th division, to Kuroki.

The following instructions issued by the Japanese commander to the General in command of 5th division, clearly explains the situation at this part of the field :—

The enemy in strength is attacking the Guard division from the direction of Feng-chi-pu, placing our right flank in a dangerous situation. The Matsunga detachment at the Chao-hsin-Ling has been surrounded by the enemy. The General in command of First Army has no strong reserve.

I intend to give all my Reserve to the First Army commander, so as to restore the situation.

By the time the 5th division reached Fan-la-shan-tzu, the danger had passed, for the Russian commander attacking the Guards right flank, had failed to realise the opportunity which the isolated situation of that Japanese division offered him, and as the Russian commander had ordered the retreat of the whole of Stalkenberg's force, of which the 2nd Siberian Corps formed a part, the pressure was relieved.

THE OPERATIONS ON THE 13TH OCTOBER.*

Although it may be said that the 13th October brought no decided advantage to either side, it was so far favourable to the Japanese that Marshal Oyama was relieved of any anxiety as to the safety of his right flank. At the close of the day, the Russian eastern force was definitely in retreat, and the arrival of the 5th Kobi Brigade, which had come up from Antung, enabled him to strengthen the 12th division.

In the centre the Japanese Guard division must be deemed fortunate to have extricated itself so easily from the dangerous situation in which it was placed by General Stalkenberg's counter attack ; for Marshal Oyama's order to the 5th division to go to General Kuroki's aid, shows how fine an opportunity was missed when the 2nd Siberian Army Corps resumed its retreat instead of pushing on in pursuit of the 3rd Guard

*On the 14th September, the Japanese 8th division detrained at Liao Yang, but did not take any part in the battle of the Sha Ho.

Regiment. Such success as was gained by the counter attack was more than balanced by the loss of Shuang-tzu-shan and Lota-shan ; and the unnecessarily long retreat of the 4th Siberian Corps (to Feng-chi-pu) offered Marshal Oyama an opening of which the full results were not yet apparent. This error, coupled by the skilful movement of reserves of the Second Army placed the Russian 1st Corps in great peril.

Elsewhere the day may be said to have favoured the Russians, for the exhaustion of the Japanese Second Army had enabled General Bildering to restore order in the western force (the Russian right wing) and again to show a bold front to his victorious opponents. Moreover, the Japanese left had been stripped of its reserves, and General Dembrovski, if he had handled his detachment with resolution, was well placed to deal an effective blow at the weak 4th Japanese division.

The situation on the night of the 13th will be seen from sketch map No. 7.

On the Japanese side—

The Second Army had gained ground.

The 4th division to the west of the Sha Ho.

The remainder of the Army was in front of the Russian position on the Sha Ho.

Of the Fourth Army, the 10th division and 10th Kobi Brigade, on right of Second Army, was upon the 1st Corps. Its remaining division, the 5th, which had been in reserve and sent to reinforce Kuroki, was at San chia tzu.

Of the 2nd division, the 15th Brigade and 11th Kobi Brigade had gained some ground. The remaining Brigade of the division, Matsunga's,

was near the Chao hsien Ling on the left of the 12th division.

The Guard division and remainder of the First Army was practically on the ground occupied on the morning of 13th.

14TH OCTOBER.

Throughout night of 13th-14th October the troops of the Russian left wing, under Stalkenberg, were in full retreat, unpursued by the Japanese whose supplies of food and ammunition were exhausted. And by early on the 14th, this force, except rear guard of 3rd Siberian Army Corps, and some Cavalry was across and north of the Sha Ho.

Marshal Oyama's intention, as conveyed in his orders for the 14th, were given as follows :—

My intention to occupy the line of the Sha Ho is as firm as ever, and I wish this to be done as quickly as possible.

Each Army must, therefore, continue its action so as to attain the desired end.

The 4th Siberian Army Corps retired over the Sha Ho before Kuroki's First Army, less the 12th division and a Brigade of 2nd division operating to the eastward, and in pursuit of Stalkenberg's eastern force.

The Fourth Army, under Nodzu, less 5th division to the eastward, acting in co-operation with 12th division, etc., routed the 1st Russian Army Corps, which retired in disorder, only saved from annihilation by a severe thunderstorm—over the Sha Ho.

Of the Second Army (Oku's) the 3rd division on the right penetrated the Russian main line of defence, held by a portion of the 10th Corps, and reached Sha-ho-pu. There it was checked, and for a time in a critical position, but in spite of determined counter attacks, it held on, and by nightfall the Japanese were in undisputed possession of the village, after heavy loss. This amounted to 300 killed and 1,165 wounded ; a total of 1,465.

Further to the westward a force of 2 squadrons, 5 battalions, with 10 guns, combined with a portion of the 4th division, captured Lin-sheng-pu at the bend of the Sha Ho, west of the railway, late in the day. Thus, by night on the 14th, the Japanese had gained a foothold in these two places—Lin-sheng-pu and Sha ho pu inside the Russian main position.

Further, again, to the westward, the 4th Japanese division, with Akijama's Cavalry Brigade on its left, was held by the 6th Siberian Corps, Grekov's Cavalry, and Dembrovski's detachment at Sao-hsiang-tun. The 6th Siberian Corps, though it did advance against Oku's 4th division, was defeated. But even this unsuccessful attack brought some relief to the rest of Bildering's right wing, and as General Bildering wrote to the commander of the 6th Siberian Corps—thanks to your forward movement I have been able to hold the position on the Sha Ho, although the 10th and 17th Corps have been compelled to use up all their Reserves. General Bildering added—I advise you to leave advanced guards in your present positions, and retire your main body during the

night to your main entrenched position in rear of the right flank of the 17th Corps.

General Dembrovski, with Grekov, advanced against Akijama, who skilfully retired before their superior numbers to Taping, and Hu chia tun, where he protected the left flank of Oyama's Army, until night put an end to the fighting.

SUMMARY OF THE OPERATIONS ON THE 14TH OCTOBER.

Except at two points the Japanese, by their renewed attacks, had carried out Marshal Oyama's intention to establish himself on the left bank of the Sha Ho. Only in the village of La ma tun and at Putilov Hill and One Tree Hill the Russians still maintained their hold upon the southern bank.

But for the defence of La-ma-tun, the village of Sha-ho-pu would have been lost, and the Russian centre would have been completely broken by the Japanese 3rd division. That this supreme disaster was avoided was due in a considerable measure to the counter attack by the 6th Siberian Army Corps, which, utterly though it failed, had the effect of delaying the capture of Ling-sheng-pu, and thereby relieving the garrison of La-ma-tun. But when it is considered that the Generals Sobelev (6th Corps), Grekov and Dembrovski, were opposed by little more than a Brigade of Infantry of 4th division and four Regiments of Cavalry (Akijama's) it is evident that they might have been expected to achieve something more decisive.

But great as the Japanese success had been it did not satisfy Marshal Oyama, who, in his orders for the 15th said :—

The First, Second and Fourth Armies have driven the enemy to the north.

I intend to reform the Japanese Armies on the left bank of the Sha Ho, in order to prepare to advance to the line of the Hun Ho.

The First Army will re-form south of Shang-wa-fang—Hsiu-chia-wen—Pi-chia-wan, and reconnoitre towards Mukden. The 12th division and the Umazawa Brigade should be recalled to Pien-niu-lu-pu, or, if possible, to Kang-ta-jen-shan, and should reconnoitre towards Fu-shun.

The Fourth Army to assemble on the Pu-tsao-a—Chang-ling-tzu, and reconnoitre towards Mukden.

The Second Army to assemble on the line Sha-ho-pu—Lin-sheng-pu, and reconnoitre towards Mukden, a strong detachment to be posted at Kuan-lin-pu to reconnoitre to the west of the Hun Ho.

The 5th division and 3rd and 11th Kobi Brigades, 1st Artillery Brigade (less one Regiment) 4th Regiment Foot Artillery, 2nd Independent Battalion Foot Artillery, and the Siege Artillery Park to return to their respective commands as at the beginning of the battle.

The headquarters of the commander-in-chief will be at Yen-tai.

Note.—No mention as yet of the 8th division, which on the 14th September, was at Liao Yang, though on October 15th-16th it moved up to Yen-tai.

15TH AND 16TH OCTOBER.

On night of 14th, Kurupatkin had no Reserve. The losses at Lin-sheng-pu, La-ma-tun, and Sha-ho-pu, as well as the failure of the 6th Siberian Corps at Chang-liang-pu, made it appear by no means improbable that a renewed attempt to break his centre near the railway and main road would be successful.

Two methods of meeting the danger appear to have been open to the Russian commander-in-chief.

One by a vigorous attack by Generals Dombrovski and Grekov against the Japanese left.

The other to strongly entrench the ground north of the Sha Ho and before Pao-chia-a-tzu, and, collecting a fresh Reserve in the neighbourhood of the threatened point. Here Kurupatkin hoped to concentrate a force of 46 battalions. But it does not appear that he had any definite idea as to how this strong Reserve was to be used.

Marshal Oyama determined not to cross the Sha Ho with his main forces at any point until all should be ready for a new advance, and in the meanwhile to restore his order of battle by gathering under their proper commanders all the units which had been dispersed during the fighting of the previous days, the 3rd Kobi Brigade to form the General Reserve.

11th Kobi Brigade remained as Reserve to 10th division.

5th division to rejoin 4th Army.

3rd Brigade of 2nd division to rejoin its division.

Its place with 12th division to be taken by the lately arrived 5th Kobi Brigade.

Umazawa's Guard Kobi Brigade was to become the First Army Reserve.

These movements were not completed until the 16th, but as the serious fighting was confined to the Second Army and Kurupatkin's right wing (or western force) Marshal Oyama was able to effect his re-organisation without interference.

On the evening of the 16th October, Marshal Oyama's Armies stood on a general line along the Sha Ho, from Pien-niu-lu-pu on the right to Ling-sheng-pu, and thence on the far side of the river was the 4th division of the Second Army, facing partly north, towards the 6th Siberian Corps, and partly north-west. From east to west the frontage was about 25 miles. And moreover, with the exception of the 2nd division, which was on the left of the Guard division, the different divisions of the three Armies stood in the same order as they did at the commencement of the operations at end of August.

Akijama's detachment was at Ta-tai, close to the left of the 4th Japanese division, on the extreme right, about ten miles eastward of Pien-niu-lu-pu, at Kao-kuan-sai was Prince Kanin's 2nd Cavalry Brigade, with Samsonov's Cavalry about four miles to the north.

To the north of Marshal Oyama's Armies, and on the far side of the Sha Ho stood Kurupatkin's Armies—on a front from Dembrovski, on the west to Samsonov, on the east, of over 40 miles.

OPERATIONS ON THE 15TH OCTOBER.

On this date General Yamada's detachment, with a Kobi Brigade attached, captured Putilov Hill* and One Tree Hill to north-east of Sha-ho-pu, and entrenched itself upon it.

The village of La-ma-tun, after a stubborn resistance, was captured by the 6th division, supported by the fire of 19 batteries.

Early on the morning of the 15th, three battalions from the 17th Corps, supported by the fire of four batteries, made determined counter attacks on Ling-sheng-pu, by a night attack, well conceived and admirably carried out. It has already been suggested that the best way for General Kurupatkin to secure his position at La-ma-tun, as well as to safeguard his ultimate retreat to Mukden, would have been a vigorous offensive against the Japanese 4th division, and Akijama's Cavalry. For this offensive the 6th Siberian Corps—General Dembrovski's force and General Grekov's Cavalry—were all available, but the 6th Corps had, on the 12th, at Lang-tzu-tai and on the 14th at Chang-liang-pu, already experienced two reverses; hence, on the 15th, the 6th Corps did little or nothing in the way of an

*This hill was so named after Major-General Putilov or Putiloff, who was personally decorated by General Kurupatkin with the cross of St. Vladimir, on the spot, for his gallant leading of magnificent bayonet charge on this eminence and on One Tree Hill.

attack on the 4th Japanese division. The same may be said of the action, or rather inaction, of the forces under Dembrovski and Grekov.

To guard against any attempt of the troops on the Russian right flank, to overlap and envelop the Japanese left, General Oku reinforced Akijama with the 3rd and 6th Cavalry Regiments.

OPERATIONS ON THE 16TH OCTOBER.

General Kurupatkin's plan for the 16th was to attack by his western force, with a view to a general advance later.

Marshal Oyama's plan was to strengthen and improve his position on the southern bank of the Sha Ho.

For various reasons General Kurupatkin abandoned any intention to make a general attack on the Japanese Armies, and resolved to concentrate his efforts to re-capture Putilov Hill and One Tree Hill*. The attacking force was placed under command of Major-General Putilov, and was assembled at Wu-chia-tun.

The attacking forces consisted of General Putilov's Brigade, together with four Siberian Rifle Regiments, which were to attack the hills from west, north and east.

General Putilov's Brigade to attack from the west. Three Siberian Regiments to attack from the north. One Siberian Regiment (the 36th) to attack from the east.

*In future to be known as Novgerod Hill.

After severe fighting the attack on the Putilov Hill succeeded, but One Tree Hill was not entirely in the hands of the Russians until 5 a.m. on the 17th. One Tree Hill was afterwards named Novgerod Hill, in order to commemorate this hard fought action, Novgerod being the principal garrison town of the 22nd division, to which the troops which captured the Hill on the night of the 16th-17th and morning of 17th August belonged. The hill captured by General Putilov's Brigade was named Putilov Hill in honour of its gallant commander.

In this action, the Russians attacking lost 3,000 men ; the Japanese, the defenders, lost 1,000.

On the 16th the 6th Siberian Corps and Dembrovski's detachment were to attack the 4th division on the Japanese left, the 6th Siberian Corps to attack from the north and north-west, Dembrovski's detachment was to attack from the westward, the objective being Chung-lu-yen-tai on the Sha Ho.

The commander of the 6th Corps, hearing of the change of Kurupatkin's plans, stopped his advance. Dembrovski, in ignorance of this change pushed on against Wan-chia-yuan-tzu. There he was held in check by the Japanese garrison, aided by two of Akijama's Cavalry Regiments from Ta-tai, and it was not until 4 p.m. learning that he alone was making the attack, that Dembrovski began to withdraw to Hsin-tai-tzu to the north. This retreat was badly conducted, and the Japanese, seizing a favourable opportunity, dashed out and made a successful counter attack, inflicting severe losses on the Russian detachment.

The storming of the Putilov and Novgerod Hills during the night of 16th-17th October marks the real termination of the week's continuous fighting.

Marshal Oyama regarded his task as accomplished.

Towards the close of October, General Kurupatkin was appointed to the supreme command of all the Russian forces in the east, and at last freed from the pernicious control of the Viceroy Admiral Alexieff, who was recalled to Russia.

It would not be going too far to say that to this Viceroy's evil influence, most of the disasters of this war were due.

ON THE 17TH OCTOBER.

The force to guard and hold the captured hills—Putilov and Novgerod—consisted of seven Regiments under General Gerngross. The 10th Corps was ordered to attack Sha-ho-pu, but this attack was first postponed and finally abandoned. General Kurupatkin, finding that in spite of the recent successes his Army was in no condition to make another great effort, decided—though by doing so he gave his enemy leisure to refill his ranks and replenish his stores—to remain inactive while awaiting further reinforcements from Europe. Similarly, the Japanese were prepared to suspend hostilities for a time, and so long as the enemy made no move they would be content to await the fall of Port Arthur and the release of General Noghi's Army. Then Marshal Oyama calculated on having a sufficient force with which to achieve a decisive victory.

Both sides accordingly went into winter quarters and began to prepare the lines on the Sha Ho which they were to occupy, with little variation, until the end of February, 1905.

The positions as occupied will be found on sketch maps No. 1 and 8. The 3rd Siberian Corps began the construction of a fortified position from Pien niu lu pu, with its left flank protected by General Samsonov's Cavalry and General Rennenkampf's detachment.

In advance of Pien niu lu pu a Russian force held an isolated position at Wai-tou-shan. General Kuroki had, some days previously, decided that he could not allow his positions to be overlooked and his camp commanded. Accordingly, during the night of 26th October, 18 guns were got into position, and, after a heavy bombardment, the Japanese Infantry advanced on the 27th and in spite of stout resistance, the Russians were driven back and the hills captured.

This capture of Wai tou shan was the last important movement for some time to come.

Marshal Oyama's Armies held the line as follows :

First Army. From Hill east of Shang-shih-chiao-tzu (5 miles south of Pien liu lu pu)—Wai-tou-shan—Ta-ying-shou-tou.

Fourth Army. From left of First Army, Chang-ling-tzu—Ku-chia-tzu.

Second Army. From left of Fourth Army, Kan-chia-la-tzu—La-ma-tun—Lin-sheng-pu—Chang liang-pu—Wan-chia-yuan-tzu.

Akijama's Cavalry on the left of Second Army.

2nd Cavalry Brigade some miles off to eastward of the First Army.

In the operations of the Sha Ho, the losses as reported by Marshal Oyama were—

Russians, killed and wounded, 40,769 men, 45 guns and a large amount of stores.

Japanese, killed and wounded, 20,450 men, 14 guns (captured by the Russians on the Putilov Hill, 16th-17th October.)

JAPANESE DEFENCES.

Villages defended by a breastwork, with head cover.

Between the villages, strong shelter trenches of low command.

In front, at distances varying from twenty to eighty yards, a line of obstacles—wire entanglements, barbed or telegraph, abattis or *chevaux de frise*.

Guns placed in pits behind or between the villages, and alternative positions were prepared whence enfilade or frontal fire could be employed at will.

The troops allotted to the defence of each section lived in bomb-proof shelters, close behind the defensive line.

Excellent arrangements were made for supplies food, fuel, and clothing ; hence the men suffered little if any discomfort in spite of the severity of the winter.

The Russian defences were far more elaborate, but were devoid of that air of comfort and cleanliness which pervaded the Japanese lines. All along the front was a succession of trenches,

redoubts, obstacles, with miles of covered approaches. In places, notably on the Putilov Hill, the works became a small fortress.

The Russian works were constructed purely for defence. Those of the Japanese, mere starting points for another forward movement.

In men and material the Russian losses had been vastly greater than those of the Japanese.

Marshal Oyama stated that he had captured 45 guns, 27 ammunition wagons, 5,474 rifles, 78,000 rounds of ammunition for rifles, and 6,920 rounds for guns, in addition to tents, clothing, and supplies.

The Russians lost over 40,000 officers and men

Against these the Japanese casualties were some 20,000 in all, whilst in material their only loss was 14 guns, captured by the Russians on Putilov Hill, on the 17th October.

To summarise the Battle of the Sha Ho. Neither commander had succeeded in achieving his object, but while the Russian failure had been complete and disastrous, the Japanese had been merely forced to content themselves with something less than what was aimed at. At the beginning of October, Kurupatkin's immediate intention was to gain the right bank of the Taitsi Ho. At the end of the battle the effort to reach the Taitsi Ho had collapsed hopelessly. Oyama, too, had failed to attain his objective, and no part of the Russian Army had been driven away from its communication with the north. In fact, the battle, in spite of the splendid pluck and endurance of the troops, was indecisive.

REMARKS ON THE STRATEGY OF THE CAMPAIGN
FROM 23RD AUGUST TO 27TH OCTOBER, 1904.

As a result of previous operations ending at the beginning of August, Marshal Oyama's Second and Fourth Armies were in close touch at and on either side of Hai-cheng, while the First Army (Kuroki's) was separated by some 40 miles of extremely rough country from the right of the Fourth Army, and lay on either bank of the Lan Ho.

The general dispositions of the Japanese Armies had practically committed them to a converging attack on Liao-Yang.

The strength of the Japanese Armies when the operations commenced was :—

	Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.	Engineers
Second Army—				
Oku	47,000	2,500	278	2,800
Fourth Army—				
Nodzu	33,000	1,000	72	1,700
First Army—				
Kuroki	45,000	1,500	120	3,000
Total	125,000	5,000	470	7,500

The strength of Kurupatkin's forces, omitting detachments, was :—

Western Force—

Zarubiev 1st and 4th Siberian Corps, 5th
division East Siberian Corps.

Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
50,000	8,000	160

Eastern Force—

Bildering 3rd Siberian Corps and 10th Corps.

Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
40,000	1,700	160

Reserve—

17th Corps and Cavalry, near Liao Yang.

Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
20,000	3,500	100

Garrison of Liao Yang—

Rifles.	Sabres.	Guns.
15,000	350	80

Total	125,000	13,550	500
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Had Kurupatkin called in detachments from Mukden and other places, his force would have been materially increased in strength.

From faulty information, the Russian commander over-estimated the strength of the Japanese forces. It was thought at Russian headquarters that the Japanese Second and Fourth Armies had a total strength of from 100,000 to 120,000 men, and that Kuroki had under him about 70,000.

This error was due to a faulty intelligence department.

Kurupatkin was, at the outset of this campaign, acting on interior lines, with the three Japanese

Armies lying on the arc of a semi-circle before him on a very extended front, and, as already mentioned with a gap of some 40 miles between the First Army and the remainder of Oyama's forces

Kurupatkin remained inactive in his advanced positions south and south-east of Liao Yang, awaiting reinforcements, leaving the initiative to his opponent.

Kurupatkin decided to await attack instead of attacking the enemy, but he should only have done this with the intention of assuming the offensive on the first opportunity.

He had a strong bridge head in the works around and before Liao Yang, covering seven bridges over the Taitsi Ho east of the walled town, and he had as well one or more bridges some eight miles above the town. He therefore had ample means of crossing the river to the right bank at will, and more rapidly than the Japanese could do so.

Had the Russian commander chosen to await attack behind the Taitsi Ho, the Japanese would have been obliged to operate against the bridge head, with the prospect of meeting a counter attack, when exhausted, in their efforts to capture the Russian works, or a portion of Oyama's Army might have been directed against the bridge head, while the remainder crossed the river to the northern bank and moved against the Russian flank and line of communications with Mukden. The Russians then, with these means of rapidly crossing the river, might have held one portion of the enemy and massed against the other the bulk of his forces.

For an Army to fight with a river dividing its forces, is considered a dangerous operation, but we might quote many instances where an Army so divided, has gained the victory, e.g., Wellington in the north of Spain, in 1813, and in the south of France in 1814, and in 1870 the German Armies before Metz separated by the Moselle.

Had Oyama attempted to pass all his Armies to the right bank of the Taitsi Ho, the Russians could have concentrated more rapidly on either bank, and have attacked with superior numbers the front or rear of the Japanese while astride the river. By such a move the Japanese line of communications by road, railway, and water, would have been laid bare and liable to a raid by the superior number of Russian cavalry. A strong mounted force, ably handled, could have, in such a case, done incalculable damage to the Japanese Armies, by capturing supplies of all sorts, destroying the railroad, and damaging the Mandarin road.

As it was, in the earlier part of September, the Japanese Armies were separated by the Taitsi Ho—Kuroki at first, with only two divisions and Umazawa's Brigade on the northern bank. It was not until the 5th of the month that his First Army was all across the river, on the southern bank were the Second and Fourth divisions, with Akijama's Cavalry Brigade, and it was not until the 16th that all Oyama's Armies were in line along the Ventai railway and to the westward. Under such conditions we can readily imagine what opportunities a thorough strategist had for decisive action against his opponent.

Up to the 24th August, when operations commenced, Kuroki's First Army more nearly threatened the Russian line of communications, and for this reason its defeat would have been advantageous to the Russians. In case of failure of the Russian attack on his Army, the result need not be disastrous, for a force detailed to contain the Second and Fourth Japanese Armies, aided by the prepared positions in advance of and close to Liao Yang, should have been able to cover the retreat of the Russian left wing to and over the Taitsi Ho. Again, the Russian commander might have detailed a suitable force to hold Kuroki's Army, and massed superior numbers against Oku's and Nodzu's Armies. A defeat of the Second Army might have had decisive results, as if driven off the line of communications south and to Niu chuang, which it covered, the result as far as the Japanese were concerned might have been disastrous.

In the event of failure there was the risk of envelopment by Kuroki's Army, but the 3rd Siberian Corps and the 10th Corps, with a detachment at Pen-hsi-hu, should have been able to guard against such a contingency.

For such operations, however, it was imperative that Kurupatkin should have concentrated, beforehand, every available man. That is, have called in all unnecessary detachments.. In any case, with the disparity or supposed disparity in numbers, it would be instructive to imagine and work out what we may conclude would have occurred under similar circumstances had Napoleon I. been in command of the Russian Armies.

Kurupatkin, however, decided to await behind his carefully prepared entrenchments the attack

of his adversary, and by so doing, he was soon to be forced to conform to the movements of his opponent.

It is an axiom in strategy that it is impossible to be too strong for the decisive battle. The whole efforts of strategy must be directed to this end, not diverting more forces, *i.e.*, detachments, for secondary objects than are absolutely necessary.

See Letters on Strategy, Prince Kraft, vol.i., page 10.

Detachments are often unavoidable, but as few as possible should be sent out. The commander of a detachment has a very difficult task to perform. It goes without saying that he must have a thorough knowledge of the broad situation and of the plans of his commander-in-chief. He must constantly remember that success at the decisive point is everything, and that his every act must be directed towards that end. He must strive to gain the ends in view without defeat or unnecessary loss, but when the end cannot be otherwise gained he must fight, even in the face of certain defeat. Finally, he must rejoin his main body the moment his absence from it can be of no further use to it.

See Hamley on "Detachments," p. 391.

Kurupatkin had away from his main Army, including detachments and troops near Liao Yang and Mukden, some 40,000 rifles, 6,000 sabres, and 74 guns. Had these been brought up in time, his Army would have been proportionally increased. Moreover, none of the commanders of detachments in the vicinity of the main army appear to have realised their important, though it may be difficult rôles.

To turn now to the Japanese.

The failure of the assaults on Port Arthur in August obliged Oyama to abandon hope of being able to fight with superior numbers on his side, for though he had received reinforcements, he had not, without General Noghi's Third Army, sufficient strength to act decisively against his enemy.

Three alternatives remained to Oyama :—

1. Retirement.

2. To remain inactive, or

3. Continue to press the Russians.

1. would have in a moral and political sense a disastrous effect. The troops would be discouraged, ground gained at great cost of life would be abandoned, and foreign loans, with which to continue the struggle, would not be obtainable.

2. would again dishearten the troops, give their enemy the initiative, and when in overwhelming strength he would be able to assume the offensive when he chose.

3. by continuing to press the enemy he would not be able to gain strong reinforcements. Here the best course was to advance boldly, trusting to superior fighting power and sound generalship to gain the victory.

Marshal Oyama decided to adopt the third alternative, and by advancing all along the line to try and envelop the Russian left.

Kurupatkin's plan was to hold the positions about An-shan-shan and before An-ping sufficiently long to oblige the enemy to disclose his

plan ; then to retire into his prepared position in rear, and pivoting on the bridge head at Liao Yang manoeuvre on both banks of the Taitsi Ho, and then, if the enemy divided his forces on either bank, of the river, fall in superior numbers on one fraction or the other.

This plan was, to a certain extent, carried out, for when Kuroki was reported as having crossed the Taitsi Ho with a portion of his Army on 31st, Kurupatkin, leaving only a portion of his Army at and around Liao Yang, crossed with the rest and moved against Kuroki to secure his line of retreat ; then, considering the situation critical, he called to the north bank the troops left on the bridge head, and with his whole Army retired on Mukden.

Kuroki, on crossing the river, captured the Manju Yama and extended his force northward towards the Yentai Coal Mines.

The attacks made by the Russians were disjointed and badly carried out—and, again owing to a faulty intelligence department, the strength of the Japanese turning force against Kurupatkin, was over-estimated. As a matter of fact the fighting north of the Taitsi Ho fell on two thirds of Kuroki's Army and Umazawa's Brigade. The remaining third, the Guard division, was only assembled north of the river on the 5th September, on which date Kuroki's 2nd and 12th divisions were along the Yentai railway, with Umazawa's Brigade in advance of the right. The Russian Army was in full retreat on Mukden.

The splendid strategic move of Kuroki across the Taitsi Ho failed for want of men to cut the

Russian line of communications, but it put a stop to Kurupatkin's counter attack up the right bank of the river, and obliged him to hasten his retreat.

Kurupatkin's move to the north of the Taitsi Ho to overwhelm Kuroki was well conceived, and up to a certain point well carried out, but the attacks on Manju Yama and other points held by Kuroki's troops were an utter failure. At these battles of Liao Yang, Kurupatkin held victory in his hand. The Japanese were exhausted and in, comparatively speaking, small numbers. Kurupatkin's reserves were not only in great strength but were still intact. All that was necessary was to lead them to the attack. But instead of attacking, the Russian Army was, once again, backed into its pre-arranged positions in rear.

See "*Lessons of the Russo-Japanese War*" by General Negrier, p. 58.

The main causes of the Japanese successes up to the end of the Battle of Liao Yang, were due to the energy, endurance, and resolution which all ranks displayed, and in which they were supported by the Government and the people of Japan. That is, their strategy went hand in hand with policy. Without the above qualities the best plans fail ; with them even the worst may succeed.

If Japan owed her success chiefly to the above causes, it is equally certain that the Russian defeat is accounted for far more by failure in these very respects than by any strategical mistakes. Mistakes were no doubt made, but so far as the strategy of the land campaign goes, Kurupatkin brought superior numbers to the field at Liao Yang and the Sha Ho. He was not taken at any great

strategical disadvantage in any of the great battles of the war, and his failure cannot be charged chiefly to strategical errors.

In July and August, when the Japanese were halted, the wisest course for Kurupatkin was probably to continue concentrating his forces as fast as he could, holding himself ready to use his interior lines when the enemy began to advance again. This statement is made on the assumption that Port Arthur could hold out against assault, and that Japanese troops were not being drawn from there for action against him. While this was so, delay was in his favour, as Russian reinforcements were arriving daily. When, however, the Japanese resumed their advance, Kurupatkin should have seized the opportunity to overwhelm their separated Armies in succession. He certainly failed to make the most of his opportunities immediately before the Battle of Liao Yang, as well as in that battle.

STRATEGICAL CONSIDERATIONS AS TO THE DEFENCE OF PORT ARTHUR.

Some argue that the defence of Port Arthur was harmful to the Russians, but though the retention of the fortress necessitated the employment of a large garrison, it detained a Japanese Army of three times its strength for seven months. The capture of the fortress is said to have cost the Japanese over 100,000 men, in killed, wounded, and "died of disease."

Moreover, the place and its harbour was necessary as a naval base to the Russians, especially

to the expected and looked for arrival of the Baltic Fleet from Europe. Though as a matter of fact that fleet was not to reach a base, it was either sunk or dispersed on arrival in the Sea of Japan by Admiral Togo's squadron.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS.

It seems the plans of campaign on each side were based on sufficiently sound arguments, but the Russians utterly failed in the execution of their plans, while any errors the Japanese may have made, were redeemed by the splendid moral qualities they displayed. This conclusion is in accordance with the teaching of military history. Failure results far more from faulty execution of a plan of campaign than from the want of perfection of the plan itself. Clausewitz says : "The first amongst all causes of victory is to pursue a great object with energy and perseverance." The Japanese acted on this principle. The Russians did not.

See Hamley, pages 383 to 387.

STRATEGY OF THE SHA HO OPERATIONS.

The various moves open to the opposing commanders have already been mentioned. We will here only refer to the actual strategy of the Sha Ho campaign.

Kurupatkin, having on 28th September divided his Army into a left wing under Bildering, right wing under Stalkenberg, and a Reserve, on the 2nd October published an unfortunate order of

the day. This may have been looked on by the Japanese as a ruse, or may have put them on the alert, though from what had happened before this, viz., attack on Umazawa at Pien-niu-lu-pu on the 17th October, reported gathering of troops to the north-east, and increased activity of the Russian Cavalry, Marshal Oyama knew something was about to happen, but before he made his offensive move, awaited the development of his opponent's designs.

The Russian commander's plan was, commencing his forward movement on the 4th October, with his left wing under Stalkenberg, advancing from near Mukden and Fu-shun, to envelop the Japanese right in the mountainous country about Pen-hsi-hu while his right wing under Bildering, moved downward along the rail road and Mandarin road, the Reserve to follow in rear of the centre, in readiness to co-operate with Bildering's right wing, if the Japanese were found to be concentrating towards their right, in attacking the Japanese centre.

The movement commenced, and Stalkenberg on the 6th October had reached the points allotted to him. But now a change came over the spirit of the dream. The advantage gained on this day, the 6th, in driving in a Japanese force was not pressed. Instead of this, by direction of the commander-in-chief, the 7th was devoted to placing positions gained in a thorough state of defence, and Umazawa, with his Mixed Brigade in a dangerous situation at Pien-niu-lu-pu, was enabled to retire on the position before Pen-hsi-hu, where he, with the 12th division on his left, held on

to this important part of the Japanese line, enabling Oyama to make his offensive movement against the Russian right and centre.

Owing to the unfortunate delay in the advance of the Russian left wing on the 7th, and neglecting to take advantage of the strategical point gained, Stalkenberg's efforts against the position before Pen-hsi-hu and to the north of it failed signally, and Kurupatkin, finding his communications menaced by some successes on the part of the Japanese left and centre (the Second and Fourth Armies) was content to abandon his projects and conform to those of his enemy.

Had Stalkenberg's advance been pushed vigorously, and with determination, it is more than probable that the Japanese right would have been driven back. A forward movement against the enemy's line of communications along the left bank of the river would have been quite feasible. But on the other hand, unless the Japanese conformed to the movement of the Russians, the advantages of the situation would lie with them, as they, by a vigorous attack on the Russian right could offer a more serious menace to the Russian communications, which were near at hand, than would even Russian success at Pen-hsi-hu, and against the Japanese communications some distance off, to those of their own Army.

But any plan once adopted should be carried out with determination. In this case, as we see, the expected decisive move of Stalkenberg's force was not only slow, but delayed a whole day by his commander-in-chief's orders.

In the Sha Ho operations, lasting from the 9th

to, say, the 17th, there was a want of vigour and determination, and when all the Japanese reserves were absorbed in the fighting line, Kurupatkin's large reserve, or better called "*striking force*" of some three corps or more, was held back instead of being launched in a determined effort to break and defeat the enemy.

On the Japanese side the delay of the 7th enabled Oyama to make his dispositions to withdraw Umazawa's detachment from its dangerous position, and then as soon as he learnt his adversary's object, to leave a comparatively weak force to hold his right flank, while with the remainder of his Army he moved against the Russian right and centre.

On the Sha Ho there were strong strategical reasons in favour of Russian offensive. Their tactics in the battle seem more open to criticism than their strategy.

The often dilatory character of the Japanese operations was largely due to the enormous difficulties of replenishing the necessary supplies of food and ammunition. The consumption of both far exceeded all anticipation. The Russians had difficulties of the same sort, but in a minor degree, as they had the railway behind them to bring up what was required, including reinforcements. Not so the Japanese, who, until the railway was re-laid and put into working order as far as Liao Yang on 3rd October, they had to trust to roads, none too good, but those from Antung to supply Kuroki's Army were difficult in the extreme, and it redounds to the credit of the Japanese Commissariat that they were able to do all they did.

Of the actual working of this department and the system we know little, for it is more than surprising to have to state that though we had numerous attachés with the Armies in the field, *our Army Service Corps was not represented ! ! !*

It has been suggested that Kurupatkin might have been better advised had he, instead of placing his Reserve behind the centre in readiness to reinforce one or other of his wings, either posted two corps along the Sha Ho to the east of the railway, and three corps in the interval between the railway and the Hun Ho ; or if space for so many men was not available to the west of the line, he had added one corps to his left wing, and placed two along the Sha Ho to the east, and two corps with Dembrovski's detachment to the west of the railway. The three groups could then have come into action simultaneously or successively as desired, while the corps west of the railway could have turned the Japanese left.

The above quoted from "Strategy of the Russo-Japanese War," by Major Bird, D.S.O., is of great strategical interest, and is a plan of operations which might, with advantage, be followed out and compared with General Kurupatkin's plan as actually attempted.

JAPANESE TACTICS.

The business of getting in touch from without with what was going on within was carried out by officers' patrols, generally accompanied by a few mounted men. The area of exploration, however, was thoroughly searched by spies beforehand.

In advance of the troops were always sent forward some Chinese to search the ground, which they did with the greatest care as the slightest negligence rendered them liable to severe punishment. For this purpose, in the Chinese villages the Japanese took away the father and sons from their families. The fathers were kept as hostages, while the sons were sent out as spies, two brothers usually being sent out in the same direction, but at different times, so that on their return the information of one could be checked by that of the other. In the event of disagreement, the father—the hostage—was sometimes put to death.

Throughout the enemy's zone of approach the Japanese spread a veritable network of native spies. Their mission was to follow every Russian movement.

Behind the spies came Cavalry patrols, supported by Infantry. For every three or four mounted men there were four or five Infantry. After the patrols came the leading detachments, and then the main body in company column with wide intervals. As a rule the Cavalry did not move in advance of the Infantry, but in rear of the leading detachments. It served to cover the advanced batteries, as well as those on the flanks. When a detachment was choosing a position, as soon as the spies had reported that no Russians had been seen in the neighbourhood, the advance sections deployed in extended order, and moved on to the selected position, where they lay down prepared for action. Then, and not till then, the main body came up and commenced to entrench. Ranges were taken to all conspicuous points

ahead and to the flank. The landscape was sketched on boards previously marked out into squares. Salient features were shown, as well as their distances. These boards were, when ready, placed in the trenches and the officers explained to their men which mark on the board corresponded to the real object in the landscape. The sappers laid out roads, constructed foot bridges where required, set up telephones, and established signal stations on the heights. They used heliographs and flags, fire, smoke and lanterns.

On the routes which the enemy must follow ambuscades were laid. These were composed of two separate parts. The first, "the gate" consisted of sharp shooters, whose duty was to allow the enemy to pass unmolested, without giving any sign of their existence. The second comprised the bulk of the troops. When the enemy's reconnaissance arrived near the position, it was signalled and received by a rapid fire, and when it fell back it was attacked in turn by "the gate."

In the earlier engagements the Japanese Infantry worked on the principles taught in the drill books of European armies ; but in July, 1904, they abandoned these old-world proceedings, finding their losses excessive.

The chief characteristic of Japanese tactics was the skilful use made of ground. During an engagement not only were the movements of their reserves never visible, but the forward movement of their advance line was equally imperceptible.

In every engagement the flanks were watched with unremitting vigilance. The Japanese recognising the difficulty of piercing the fighting front,

turned their attention to turning movements, and realising the danger of such movements, invariably placed their reserves on their flanks. This they did not only to meet the enemy's turning or enveloping move, but also to be able to envelop similar movement of the enemy, and thus practically reduce him to impotence.

During the day they altogether avoided bayonet charges, but to meet such charges the firing line either moved back rapidly before it or else opened out in such a manner that the attacking force was received by a rapid fire from the troops in rear..

In the attack the Japanese soldier dispensed with his knapsack. He carried his rifle, cartridges, water bottle, rations, entrenching tool, and his shelter tent equipment.

The following were the general principles of the Japanese attack. The ground having been carefully reconnoitred by day, the actual advance was carried out at night. Just before dawn they dug trenches, in which they took shelter by day. The skirmishers in advance dug trenches for themselves. The following night the advance was resumed. The troops of the second line thus occupied the trenches left behind by the first, and so on throughout. Under protection of the guns, the fighting line arrived within striking distance. Rifle fire was only used at short ranges. The advance line was reinforced to its full strength and the attack itself was then delivered by a march, generally executed at night, if possible, without halting.

General de Negrier, in his "Lessons on the Russo-Japanese War" (page 65) gives a most interesting and instructive account of an attack by the 3rd division, Second Army, and 5th division, Fourth Army, on the Shu shan pu part of the Russian second line of defence on 30th-31st August, 1904, of which the following is an extract :—

During the night of the 28th-29th August, the Japanese approached the Russian positions. On the 29th the march which had been suspended during the day was resumed at nightfall. The 3rd and 5th divisions had been ordered to capture the lines of Shu shan pu, some three miles south of Liao Yang. They had 20,000 infantry, 36 mountain guns, 36 Howitzers, with other batteries 108 guns. On the 30th, before daybreak, the 1st battalion, 41st Regiment, supported by the rest of the Regiment, moved against the trenches defending a height situated on the Russian extreme left, and carried them at the point of the bayonet after a terrific struggle. The 3rd division in its turn, had begun to move forward during the night. The infantry advanced in echelon in a series of deployed lines. Their direction was to the left. Their successive lines were to remain at right angles to the railway, and strictly maintain their alignment. The advance through the millet, combined with the darkness, was so difficult, that a little before dawn the first line found itself still something over a mile from the Russian position. There it halted and began to build trenches, so that by daylight it might be protected from the Russian guns about 2,500 yards distant. For this purpose they made use of their own tools, as well as those of the battalion equipment carried by four pack-horses of first-line transport.

At 5.30 a.m. on the morning of the 30th, the Artillery opened fire. This fire was carried on throughout the day without producing any decided result. The 3rd division remained concealed and motionless in their trenches. The 5th division, on the contrary, taking advantage of natural shelter, and of the occupation of the height on the Russian left, attempted an attack. After suffering considerable loss it was compelled to fall back.

On the night of 30th-31st August, the 5th division recommenced the attack, and this time captured by assault two small hills, which were three times taken and re-taken during this deadly conflict. Two companies of the 41st Regiment were utterly wiped out, but the survivors of the 1st Battalion succeeded in clinging to the position. They were reinforced by the rest of the regiment.

This attack on this part of the Russian line of defence had been ordered to facilitate the enveloping movement of General Oku's First Army.

THE ADVANCE AND ASSAULT OF RUSSIAN DEFENCES

The firing line was broken up into sections, each under an officer or non-commissioned officer.

To each of these sections the particular point in the enemy's position it was to make for was pointed out.

The first line rushed from the trenches, with the section leaders in advance, running as fast as possible to gain the nearest depression. The men followed without any attempt to keep order.

Their only thought was to arrive as quickly as possible at the spot where they would lie down.

And so the advance was conducted, the men following their leaders. The leaders had chosen the shelter ahead, which was to be reached in each successive rush.

The sections, where it was possible to get better cover, diverged to right or left.

After the first halt, the even line of the start was broken. The different sections were scattered over the ground, some creeping, others running as hard as they could to the next cover.

The thousand yards or more to be crossed before reaching the Russian accessory defences are covered in this manner, and it is not till now that what remained of the Japanese line was reformed under shelter of a bank of earth which the Russians had thoughtlessly raised to protect their barbed wire entanglements.

As soon as the first line had got half way to its objective, the second line, in turn, quitted its trenches, and rush on in a similar way to the first, taking advantage of ground and cover, and getting forward somehow. The third line followed the second, and so on throughout. Six columns in succession reached the hill side, and one after the other protected themselves behind the bank of earth, about one hundred yards from the enemy's trenches. All this time volunteers were busy cutting the barbed wire under the very muzzles of the Russian rifles, and thus opened passages through the entanglements.

The whole Japanese line was now lit up by the glitter of steel flashing from the scabbard. It is the last phase, the assault. Once again the officers dash to the front, with ringing cries of "Banzai!" echoed by the rank and file. Slowly, but not to be denied, they made headway, in spite of all obstacles and the hail of bullets.

Whole units were destroyed, but others took their places, and the attackers pressed onwards.

Then, when the Japanese attacking lines were within a few yards of the Russian trenches, the enemy retired, pursued by fire. This section of the Russian "second line of defence," had been captured. This assault lasted exactly one hour and ten minutes.

GENERAL TACTICS.

To advance and attack by night.

To shelter in trenches by day.

The intrenching tool is indispensable in the offensive. The men should, beforehand, have been practised in digging with it lying down. Trenches dug by the advanced lines should be occupied by lines following in succession. The general form of attack never varied. Effort after effort obstinately repeated was the sole method employed and overcame the most stubborn resistance.

This war has again demonstrated that by offensive tactics alone can victory be obtained.

An Army forced to adopt the defensive, whether owing to circumstances of a political nature or in consequence of its numerical inferiority, must defend itself by incessant counter attacks.

The war of 1904-05 proves equally that modern armies can no longer follow safely the beaten tracks of other days. One superiority of the Japanese consisted in the fact that their Army was not linked to the past by those old-world conventionalities which we dignify by the names of traditions.

There is little or nothing of an instructive nature to be said of the Russian tactics. There were several instances of night attacks admirably conceived and carried out by the Russians, notably those on the Sha Ho, when Ling-sheng-pu was retaken from the Japanese, and the recapture of the hills north-east of Sha-ho-pu, afterwards named the Putilov and Novgerod Hills, in honour of the success by General Putilov on the night of the 16th-17th September.

The Russian soldiers fought as they have ever done, gallantly. Failure was due, in most cases, to inferior leadership.

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1 Peninsula Campaign.

Battle of Corunna (January 16th, 1809), also inset map of Spain shewing general movements of the Campaign.

2 Spain and Portugal to Illustrate Peninsula Campaign.

From March, 1811 to end of 1813, also inset maps of Salamanca and a separate outline map of Spain for working out Schemes.

3 Bohemian Campaign, 1866.

With inset map of Battle of Koniggratz.

4 Virginia Campaign (Grant & Lee)

With inset map of Spottsylvania, The Wilderness, Petersburg, Cold Harbor, North Anna, Totopotomoy, etc.

5 Franco-Prussian War, 1870-1.

Country around Metz, and separate map of country between Paris and Metz.

6 Russo-Japanese War, 1904.

NOTE. Please state which period required for the notes, which are done for: 1. Outbreak of Hostilities to 24th August, 1904 2. 23rd August to end of October, 1904.

7 American War of Secession, 1861-3.

Operations in the Eastern Theatre (Virginia Campaign).

8 Indian Mutiny, 1857.

With inset map shewing railways in 1910.


9 Russo-Turkish War, 1877.

10 The Afghan War, 1878-80.

11 The Napoleonic Campaign, 1805.

Others in preparation.

Write for Military List.




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Campaign in Manchuria.






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
OPERATIONS OF KUROKI'S ARMY

From 26th Aug^t to 5th Sept^r 1904.







Nº 5.



Nº 4.





Nº 6.

BATTLE OF THE SHA HO.

Positions of opposing forces on the 10th October 1904.



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No. 7.

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Positions of opposing forces on the 12th October 1904.

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